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Management summary
This report provides information on Zimbabwe on behalf of the implementation of the DECISIONS 
FOR LIFE project in that country. The DECISIONS FOR LIFE project aims to raise awareness amongst 
young female workers about their employment opportunities and career possibilities, family building and the 
work-family balance. This report is part of the Inventories, to be made by the University of Amsterdam, for 
all 14 countries involved. It focuses on a gender analysis of work and employment.  
History (2.1.1). After independence in 1980, initially the government invested in education and health. 
Soon, tensions between ZANU and ZAPU led to violence, ending by the formation of ZANU-PF, led by 
Robert Mugabe. His government growingly took refuge to violation of human and trade union rights. The 
creation of MDC as an opposition party, in 1999, was obviously a catalyst for the country’s most violent 
decade in which Mugabe and his cronies tried to retain power by all means. As a result, large parts of the 
economy have been destroyed and repeatedly a majority of the population of the once prosperous country 
has to rely on food aid. In 2008, a Global Political Agreement has been reached, which since 2009 is imple-
mented by a government of national unity (GNU). 
Governance (2.1.2). Zimbabwe is a republic. In 2009 militia and “war veterans” trained by ZANU-PF 
continued to harass and intimidate members of the opposition, trade unions, and others. Corruption is 
widespread. Female participation in politics is low but growing. The life of rural women is dominated by 
traditional practices, which grant very few rights to women. There is no speciﬁ  c legislation against domestic 
violence. Women encounter signiﬁ  cant discrimination in ownership rights. 
Prospects (2.1.3). The 2009-10 economic recovery remains fragile and depends on the containment of 
political violence. It can be questioned whether the GNU is able to protect in particular ZCTU trade union-
ists adequately, though there are hopeful signs as well. 
Communication (2.2). The number of cell phones in use has grown to 138 per 1,000 of the population in 
2008. By that year, there were 119 Internet users per 1,000. Freedom of speech and of press remain limited, 
though in May 2010 some openings were visible. As the Internet has remained unrestricted, many Zimba-
bweans use to this medium to access independent news.
The sectoral labour market structure – Formal and informal employment (2.3.1). With an economy in disarray, reli-
able labour market statistics are lacking. Formal employment likely has decreased between 1999-2009 from 
1.3 to 0.6 million. 80-94% of the working age population may have only work from which they derive an 
income for a few hours per day or even per week.Page ● 8
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The sectoral labour market structure – Migration (2.3.2) Recently about four million Zimbabweans are es-
timated to live abroad with the majority leaving in the past 5-6 years, mainly in search of basic food and 
health care. Many migrated to South Africa, among which 40-50% women. They are highly vulnerable to 
exploitation.
Legislation (2.4.1). Zimbabwe has ratiﬁ  ed the eight core ILO Labour Conventions. Yet, an ILO Commis-
sion of Inquiry in 2009 concluded to systematic, and even systemic, violation of the Conventions. Mecha-
nisms for organising legal strikes are extremely complicated. 
Labour relations and wage-setting (2.4.2). In spite of continuous harassment and intimidation of ofﬁ  cers 
and members, the ZCTU organises over 40% of the formal employed. 70% of the about 3 million-strong 
workforce of the informal sector is member of the ZCIEA, created by the ZCTU. 
The statutory minimum wage (2.5.1). In November 2009 there were 28 sectoral minimum wages, varying 
from USD 30 to 391 per month. All remained below the ofﬁ  cial poverty line of USD 552 in 2009. 
Poverty (2.5.2). After independence poverty ﬁ  rst diminished, but from the early 1990s on rose till in the 
2000s over 80% lived below the national poverty threshold as well as below the international USD 2 per 
day poverty line. Poverty has been concentrated in the rural areas and has been feminized. Recent estimates 
conclude to more than 85% living below the national poverty line, meaning that 10 million or more Zimba-
bweans live in desperate poverty. In the course of the 2000s, large parts of the population had to take refuge 
to remittances from migrants.
Population and fertility (2.6.1). From 2002-2008, due to both the HIV/AIDS pandemic and migration 
population has decreased slowly, a decrease most likely speeding up in 2009 and early 2010. The total fertil-
ity rate is about 3.7 children per woman. The adolescent fertility rate is with 101 per 1,000 rather high; early 
marriage is widespread. With on average 45 years (44 years for women), life expectancy at birth is one of 
the world’s lowest.
Health (2.6.2). In 2007 there were an estimated 1.2-1.4 million suffering from HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe. 
Since 2001 there is a downward trend in the HIV prevalence rate due to a combination of high mortality 
and changes in sexual behaviour. The country has over 1.3 million orphans of which one million orphaned 
by AIDS. AIDS-related illness and death are acutely threatening the viability of many households. In the last 
decade the health infrastructure has collapsed, and the vulnerability for epidemics like cholera increased.Page ● 9
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Women’s labour market share (2.6.3). Around 2000, women made up nearly half of the country’s labour 
force, with majorities in agriculture, services and government. Among paid employees the female shares 
were much lower. These shares were also comparatively low in the higher-ranked and administrative oc-
cupations.
Literacy (2.7.1). The adult literacy rate –-those age 15 and over that can read and write—in 1999-2006 
was 90.7%: 93.7% for men and 87.6% for women. In 2007 the literacy rate for 15-24-year-olds stood at 
98.3%: 97.9% for young men and an even higher 98.7% for young women.
Education of  girls (2.7.2). Though in the early 2000s enrollment in education was rather high, enrollment 
rates at all levels have fallen considerably due to internal displacement, emigration of teachers, and sheer 
poverty. Girls are more likely than boys to leave or not begin school. Most recemtly access to public educa-
tion seems to improve. 
Female skill levels (2.7.3). A rough indication is that about 60% of women in the current labour force may 
be called unskilled, 37.5% skilled and 2.5% highly skilled. We estimate the current size of the target group 
of DECISIONS FOR LIFE for Zimbabwe at about 35,000 girls and young women 15-29 of age working in 
urban areas in commercial services. If the country’s recovery takes off rather succesfully, another 60-70,000 
may be added in the next ﬁ  ve years.
Wages (2.8.1). Older wage data suggests a rather large wage dispersion across industries, with low wage 
rates for occupations with a high share of women, pointing at a considerable gender pay gap.
Working conditions (2.8.2). Older data indicates small gender differences in hours worked, with on average 
long hours for paid employees. Most likely current overall patterns are more like those of the self-employed, 
working shorter and irregular hours.Page ● 10
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1.  Introduction: The Decisions for Life 
project
The DECISIONS FOR LIFE project aims to raise awareness amongst young female workers about 
their employment opportunities and career possibilities, family building and the work-family balance. The 
lifetime decisions adolescent women face, determine not only their individual future, but also that of soci-
ety: their choices are key to the demographic and workforce development of the nation.
DECISIONS FOR LIFE is awarded a MDG3 grant from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs as part of its strategy to support the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals no 3 (MDG3): 
“Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women”. DECISIONS FOR LIFE more speciﬁ  cally focuses on 
MDG3.5: “Promoting formal employment and equal opportunities at the labour market”, which is one of 
the four MDG3 priority areas identiﬁ  ed in Ministry’s MDG3 Fund. DECISIONS FOR LIFE runs from 
October 2008 until June 2011 (See http://www.wageindicator.org/main/projects/decisions-for-life).
DECISIONS FOR LIFE focuses on 14 developing countries, notably Brazil, India, Indonesia, the CIS 
countries Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the southern African countries Angola, Botswana, 
Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Project partners are International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC), Union Network International (UNI), WageIndicator Foundation, and University of 
Amsterdam/AIAS.
This report is part of the Inventories, to be made by the University of Amsterdam, for all 14 countries 
involved. These Inventories and the underlying gender analyses are listed in the Table. All reports will be 
posted at the project website. In this country report on Zimbabwe the sequence of the sections differs from 
the table. The report covers mainly Activity nr 1.03, the Gender analysis regarding pay and working condi-
tions (or, as Chapter 2 is called here, work and employment). Partly included (in section 2.4.1) is Activity 
1.01, Inventories of national legislation; partly the analysis of national legislation has resulted in a separate 
product, the DecentWorkCheck for Zimbabwe. Activity 1.02, Inventories of companies’ regulations, will 
take place through a company survey. Preparations for Activities 1.03a and 1.03b have resulted in a number 
of lists, to be used in the WageIndicator web-survey for country-speciﬁ  c questions and their analyses (Chap-
ter 3). References can be found in Chapter 4; Chapter 5 gives more insight in the WageIndicator. Page ● 12
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Table 1. Activities for DECISIONS FOR LIFE by the University of Amsterdam
No Inventories
1.01 Inventories of national legislation
1.02 Inventories of companies’ regulations
1.03 Gender analysis regarding pay and working conditions
1.03a Gender analysis start-up design of off-line gender analyses inventory
1.03b Gender analysis data-entry for off-line use inventoriesPage ● 13
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2.  Gender analysis regarding work and 
employment
2.1.  Introduction: the general picture 
2.1.1. History
Already by the Middle Ages, there was a civilization in current Zimbabwe, evidently shown by ruins at 
Great Zimbabwe, near Masvingo and other sites. In the 1880s the British arrived with Cecil Rhodes’s British 
South Africa Company (BSAC). Rhodes promoted the colonisation of the region’s land, with British control 
over labour as well as precious metals and other mineral resources. In 1895 the BSAC adopted the name 
Rhodesia for the territory of Zambesia, and in 1898 Southern Rhodesia became the ofﬁ  cial denotation for 
the region south of the Zambezi, later to become Zimbabwe. The region to the north was administered 
separately by the BSAC and later named Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). Southern Rhodesia became a 
self-governing British colony in 1923. The country was ruled according to a clear division along racial lines 
at the expense of the African majority. The pillar of the early colonial economy was the mines on which 
Africans were sent to work despite a reluctance due to their agricultural activities which supplied their needs. 
The Industrial Conciliation Act 1934 excluded African workers from collective bargaining procedures and 
from training for skilled jobs, by excluding “natives” from the deﬁ  nition of employees. The Labour Act 
of the same year prohibited Africans from entering skilled trades and professions. Worse of all, land and 
agricultural policies concentrated the majority of rural Africans in “communal areas”. These areas, currently 
home for two-thirds of the population, make up 42% of Zimbabwe’s land area and were already in the 
1970s overcrowded and overgrazed (wikipedia Zimbabwe; Bird and Shepherd 2003; Meredith 2005; ILO 
2009). 
In 1957, the ﬁ  rst major nationalist movement, the African National Congress (ANC), was launched in 
Rhodesia, led by Joshua Nkomo. Two years later the British banned the ANC, as they did to its successors, 
like in 1962 to the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). In 1963 the nationalist movement split into 
ZAPU led by Nkomo and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Robert Mugabe. On 
11 November 1965, the white-minority Rhodesia government led by Ian Smith made a unilateral declara-
tion of independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom. The British deemed this an act of rebellion, but Page ● 14
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did not re-establish control by force. On their request, the United Nations (UN) imposed sanctions on 
the white minority regime, but these were busted, in particular by the major multinational oil companies. 
Smith’s government ruthlessly enforced discriminatory measures against the black majority. A guerilla war 
intensiﬁ  ed, with armies from both ZAPU and ZANU involved. An internal economic crisis, mainly caused 
by the impossibility to export and expand beyond strict limits and by limited black buying power, growingly 
convinced business leaders that white-minority rule turned into an anachronism. Finally, the independence 
of Angola and Mozambique, in 1975, changed the fortunes of white minority rule irrevocably. ZAPU and 
ZANU were now able to operate from basis in Mozambique and Zambia. Under their pressure the British 
called for negotiations. On 21 December 1979, the Lancaster House Agreement was signed, ending guerilla 
warfare. In the elections of February 1980, Mugabe and his ZANU-PF (Patriottic Front) won a landslide 
victory, gaining 57 of 80 black seats in parliament, mainly in Shona-speaking areas, leaving 20 seats for 
Nkomo’s ZAPU, mainly conﬁ  ned to the Ndebele and Kalanga areas of the country (wikipedia Zimbabwe; 
Bailey 1979; Meredith 2005; Bond 2007). 
Zimbabwe’s independence was declared on 18 April 1980. Mugabe marked the occasion with a speech 
pledging reconciliation; he seemed particularly keen to win the trust of the white commercial farmers1 Bu-
oyed up by a huge inﬂ  ux of Western aid, the new government embarked on a “growth with equity” policy, 
including programmes to extend education and health care to the entire population. Human development 
indicators went up. A land redistribution scheme, highly needed in view of the overcrowded communal 
areas and related land shortages, was also initiated, though limited land became available for resettlement, 
partly as under the Lancaster House Agreement land could only be acquired as the owners wished to sell. 
Trade unions for the ﬁ  rst time enjoyed freedom of association and expression. However, the integration 
of the two guerilla armies led to growing tensions. In early 1982, Mugabe accused Nkomo to instigate a 
military coup; Nkomo was sacked from the government and ZAPU properties were looted. Resistance of 
former ZIPRA (the ZAPU-afﬁ  liated army) soldiers led to what has become known as the Gukurahundi or 
Matabeleland Massacres, which ran from January 1983 till deep in 1985. With an outburst of violence, fol-
lowed by measures leading to massive starvation, Mugabe’s Fifth Brigade, trained by North Korean military, 
crushed any resistance in Matabeleland. In the presidential drive for a one-party state, an estimated 20,000 
people were murdered; many thousands more were beaten and tortured. The violence ended after ZANU 
and ZAPU by the end of 1987 reached a unity agreement that merged the two parties, creating ZANU-PF 
1  The 6,000 white commercial farmers at the time of independence owned nearly 40% of all agricultural land and two-thirds 
of the best land. By the time they grew 90% of marketed maize and of cotton, and employed some 271,000 people. By 2000, 
they employed about 400,000 workers (Meredith 2005, 618, 637). Page ● 15
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(Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front). In the meantime, partly due to provocations of apart-
heid South Africa, the honeymoon between Mugabe and the whites was deﬁ  nitely over. Within three years 
of independence, half of the white population emigrated (wikipedia Zimbabwe; Meredith 2005; ILO 2009; 
website UNDP).
Having established a de facto one-party state, Mugabe accumulated immense personal power. On 30 
December, 1987 he was declared executive president by parliament, combining the roles of head of state, 
head of government and commander-in-chief of the defence forces. A new ruling elite emerged of politi-
cians, businessmen and their cronies – as one of Mugabe’s protégés characterized, “If you want to be rich 
you must join ZANU-PF” (Meredith 2005, 628). The shopping trips of Mugabe’s wife Grace to London’s 
Harrod’s became notorious. Corruption, large and small, ﬂ  ourished. Elections in March 1990 resulted in 
another victory for Mugabe and his party, which won 117 of the 120 election seats. Election observers esti-
mated voter turnout at only 54% and found the campaign neither free nor fair (wikipedia Zimbabwe).
In the 1990s, per capita income fell and poverty grew as a result of droughts (the drought of 1991-92 
was devastating), growing land hunger, and the spread of HIV/AIDS together with a badly designed eco-
nomic reform programme. In October 1990, the government launched its Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP, 1991-95). In the 1980s, the average annual GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth of 
3.4% was positive but insufﬁ  cient to absorb a growing young labour force and to generate enough tax rev-
enue for the expanding public sector. And though other aspects, like the country’s foreign debt, remained 
quite manageable, the “low” growth rate was used as the pretext to stimulate Zimbabwe’s economy through 
the ESAP – radical free-market policies adopted seemingly voluntarily but under pressure of the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the UK, and ﬁ  tting in the “Washington Consensus” of 
those days (cf. Klein 2007). The core of ESAP was the liberalisation of markets and the reduction of the 
budget deﬁ  cit, including cost recovery in education and health. Both design and implementation of ESAP 
were botched. The public sector was subject to redundancies and heavy wage cuts; the private sector un-
derwent the shocks of sudden import liberalisation, with heavy de-industrialization and massive job losses 
in labour-intensive sectors like clothing, textiles and electronics, and all were hit by inﬂ  ation averaging over 
30% yearly. Minimum wages for industrial workers were abolished. Poverty exploded. Urban households, 
depending on formal employment, saw their incomes severely reduced throughout the 1990s, on average Page ● 16
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to 30-40% of the 1990 level. Overall incomes fell to about 70% of that level (Addison and Laakso 2003; 
Meredith 2005; Potts 2006a; Bond 2007; website SAPRIN; see also section 2.5.2 on poverty).
From 1997, Zimbabwe’s economy showed a deep “plunge”, including hyperinﬂ  ation and massive short-
ages of foreign exchange. Mugabe’s military expendition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in 
support of Kabila’s regime (1998-2002), meant extra expenditure of at least USD 200 million, to a level 
that according to the ﬁ  nance minister the country could no longer sustain. In 2004, the country’s GDP had 
fallen to less than 60% of its 1997 level. The share of manufacturing in GDP, by 1988 still 22%, decreased 
to below 15%; by 2001 manufacturing production had fallen below its 1980 level. Mining was hampered by 
a number of problems, though there was a surge in informal mining, particularly gold-panning. Tourism 
had been an important source of income and foreign exchange, but obviously Western tourists were not 
inclined to visit a country where violence and violation of human rights were at the order of the day: during 
the 2000s the number of tourists fell by 90% (see also section 2.1.3). Land invasions (see below), recurrent-
droughts and unavaibility of inputs and ﬁ  nance led to a sharp decline in agricultural exports, traditionally the 
country’s leading export producing sector. Between 2000 and 2007, production of nearly all food security 
crop fell by 50-60%. From a net exporter of maize Zimbabwe turned into a net importer. A severe drought 
in 2002 aggravated the rural situation further; in 2003, about two-thirds of households required food aid, 
and this continued in 2004-05, and again in 2009. A once prosperous country had to rely on foreign relief 
supplies (ZNVAC 2003; Addison and Laakso 2003; Meredith 2005; Potts 2006a; World Bank 2009c; GOZ 
2009; UN OCHA 2010).
From 1993, resistance against the government’s radical free-market policies grew, and the following 
years witnessed growing strike and demonstration activity; the urban poor repeatedly took refuge to food ri-
ots (see section 2.4.2). In 1999 the labour movement joined with lawyers and civic groups to form the Move-
ment for Democratic Change (MDC), led by former union confederation president Morgan Tsvangirai. The 
leadership of the MDC drew strongly on trade unionists. In a referendum in February, a draft constitutional 
proposal was rejected by 56% of the votes – the ﬁ  rst time ZANU-PF was defeated. Shortly after the refer-
endum, in a campaign coordinated from ZANU-PF headquarters jointly with the War Veteran’s Association 
(funded by the government to hire unemployed urban youth), armed gangs started to invade white-owned 
farms across the country, assaulting farmers and their families. The police refused to take action. The occu-
pied farms then became bases from which to intimidate farm workers as well as teachers and health workers, 
many of whom were MDC supporters. After months of intimidation and violence, ZANU-PF in the June Page ● 17
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2000 elections secured a narrow victory, with 48% of the votes cast winning 62 parliamentary seats; MDC, 
with 47%, won 57 seats, based on urban and Matabeleland votes. Soon after these elections, the government 
announced a “fast track” land reform plan. The plan quickly degenerated in a chaotic and extremely vio-
lent land grab, led by ZANU-PF bosses, military and police commanders. MDC supporters were explicitly 
banned from receiving any “fast track” land. Mugabe’s government not only encouraged and applauded the 
violation of its own laws, it also deﬁ  ed the independent judiciary’s rules against illegal actions. For example, 
after having received death threats, the head of the Supreme Court resigned. The 2002 presidential election 
took place in a climate of violence and was clearly rigged by Mugabe. Some 3,000 white farmers were given 
45 days to stop production and another 45 days to leave their property without compensation. Many farms 
were taken over by Mugabe’s family and cronies; it meant the end of commercial agriculture as a major in-
dustry in Zimbabwe (Addison and Laakso 2003; Meredith 2005; CIA World Factbook).
In May 2005 the Zimbabwean government embarked on another unprecedented and internationally 
widely condemned campaign, this time within the towns; Operation Murambatsvina (“Restore Order”) was 
designed to eradicate “illegal” housing and informal jobs. The United Nations two months later estimated 
that 650,000 to 700,000 people had lost either the basis of their livelihoods or their homes, or both, and that 
in total 2.4 million people were affected. The government made no provisions at all for the victims (Potts 
2006b). In particular those who returned to rural areas often faced unemployment, food shortages, and 
other economic and social stresses. According to an Amnesty International report (2006), Operation Mu-
rambatsvina resulted in the destruction of at least 32,500 small businesses across the country and the loss of 
livelihood for more than 97,600 persons, mostly poor women. Because of their preponderance as vendors 
and informal traders, women were disproportionately affected by the destruction of small business (ZCTU 
2005). An estimated 300,000 children lost access to education as a result of displacement. The operation dis-
rupted access to medical care, particularly for HIV/AIDS patients. The government reportedly prevented 
or interfered with humanitarian organisations’ efforts to provide shelter and food assistance. In 2008 it was 
reported that victims of Operation Murambatsvina continued to suffer and lacked permanent shelter. Some 
of those who returned to rural areas were regarded with suspicion by rural chiefs and were unable to remain; 
they often faced food shortages. In urban areas the continued lack of housing contributed to high rent and 
overcrowding. Both the land seizures and Operation Murambatsvina have seriously aggravated Zimbabwe’s 
economic and food situation, in 2008 reaching the proportions of a humanitarian crisis including the areas 
of housing and public health (US Dept of State 2010; UN OCHA 2010). Page ● 18
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In 2005, ZANU-PF rigged the parliamentary elections again through fraud and intimidation. In 2007 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) designated then South African president Thabo 
Mbeki to serve as mediator between Robert Mugabe’s government and the MDC. The mediation aimed 
to produce a mutually agreed election date and procedures to rewrite the constitution. While the media-
tion was ongoing, Mugabe announced in January 2008 that elections would be held in March 2008, despite 
Tsvangirai’s protests that mediation was still under way and there was not enough time to campaign. On 
March 29, 2008, the country held harmonized elections for the presidency, House of Assembly, Senate, and 
local government. The MDC secured a majority in numerous local government councils and in the House 
of Assembly, though overall Tsvangirai did not win by the margin legally required as to replace Mugabe. 
On September 15, 2008, a Global Political Agreement (GPA) was signed as a power-sharing agreement 
under which Mugabe retained the presidency, Tsvangirai from MDC-T became prime minister and Arthur 
Mutambara from MDC-M deputy prime-minister. Since February 2009, the GPA is implemented by what is 
variously called the Government of National Unity (GNU) or Inclusive Government (ILO 2009; US Dept 
of State 2010; wikipedia Zimbabwe). 
Against the background presented here it does not surprise that Zimbabwe’s GDP development from 
1998 to 2008 has been negative, with an average yearly decrease of the GDP per capita of 5.8% and lows 
of minus 12% in 2002, 18% in 2003 and 14% in 2008 (World Bank 2009c). The population of Zimbabwe 
as a whole is currently poorer than at independence. Even worse, already by 2005 the purchasing power of 
the average Zimbabwean had dropped to the same levels in real terms as 1953 (US Dept of State 2010). 
Inﬂ  ation rose from an annual rate of 32% in 1998 to an ofﬁ  cial estimated high of 231,000,000% in July 
2008, according to the country’s Central Statistical Ofﬁ  ce. Then, the central bank introduced a new 100 bil-
lion dollar note. In early February 2009, the Government of National Unity announced a multi-currency 
regime, coined the “dollarisation” of the economy: the Zimbabweans were permitted to use more stable 
currencies (e.g. US dollar, Botswana Pula, UK Pound, SA Rands and US Dollar) to do business, alongside 
the Zimbabwe dollar (US Dept of State 2010; Kabange 2010). By then, large parts of the economy were no 
longer operative. For instance, the average capacity utilization in industry had fallen below 10% (Republic 
of Zimbabwe 2010). 
Since 2006 Zimbabwe is no longer registered in UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), as it was 
unable or unwilling to provide the data requested. For 2005 its HDI was rated 0.513, ranking no. 151 of 
177 countries -- slightly below countries like Bangladesh and Haiti but still above the rates of Angola, Mo-Page ● 19
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zambique, Malawi and Zambia (UNDP 2008). The 2005 rate was slightly higher than the country’s lowest 
HDI rate, 0.491 in 2004. The HDI ratings over time indicate the country’s social and economic vicissitudes 
since 1975. By that year, Zimbabwe’s HDI was 0.548, increasing to 0.576 in 1980 and a high of 0.682 in 
1985, before starting its glide to 0.639 in 1990, 0.591 in 1995, and 0.525 in 2000 (UNDP 2007-2008). For 
2005, the estimated average earned income of the Zimbabweans was set at USD 2,585 for men and USD 
1,499 for women, or 58% women to men parity (UNDP 2007-2008): a low rate that –though surrounded 
by uncertainties-- is rather indicative for the position of Zimbabwean women in the ﬁ  eld of work and em-
ployment.
2.1.2. Governance
Zimbabwe is constitutionally a republic. As indicated, the power of head of state, head of government 
and commander-in-chief of the defence forces is accumulated in the person of Robert Mugabe. Under 
constitutional changes in 2005, an upper chamber, the Senate, was reinstated; the House of Assembly is 
the lower chamber of Parliament. We also described that, although the constitution provides citizens with 
the right to change their government peacefully, this right was seriously restricted in practice, at least till 
the March 2008 elections. During 2009, the government or its agents committed politically motivated, ar-
bitrary, and unlawful killings. Youth militia and war veterans trained by ZANU-PF continued to harass and 
intimidate members of the opposition, trade unions, student movement, civic groups, journalists considered 
critical of the government, and white farmers and their employees. Rape was also used as a tool of political 
violence. MDC members used violence and torture in retaliation for past ZANU-PF-led violence. Police 
also used excessive force to disperse demonstrators (US Dept of State 2010).
Prison conditions in 2009 remained harsh and life threatening. Poor sanitary conditions and overcrowd-
ing persisted, which aggravated outbreaks of cholera, diarrhea, measles, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS-re-
lated illnesses. In April 2009 an undercover ﬁ  lm crew produced a documentary entitled “Hellhole” that de-
picted serious malnutrition and unsanitary conditions that directly contributed to severe cholera in prisons 
in late 2008 and early 2009. Local NGOs believed that the publicity from the documentary prompted the 
government to grant NGOs greater access to provide prisoners with food, clothing, and medical and legal 
services. NGOs estimated that there were 500 women in prison; 43 children under the age of ﬁ  ve lived with 
their incarcerated mothers. They reported that women generally received more food from their families than 
male prisoners, resulting in reduced rates of malnutrition. Prison ofﬁ  cials also appeared to have prioritized Page ● 20
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food distribution to women. However, women prisoners continued to endure signiﬁ  cant hardship (US Dept 
of State 2010). 
In 2008 and 2009 police were poorly trained and equipped, underpaid, and corrupt. Security forces 
perpetrated government-sponsored politically motivated violence. Police routinely and violently disrupted 
public gatherings and demonstrations, and tortured opposition and civil society activists in their custody. 
It was difﬁ  cult for rank-and-ﬁ  le police to remain impartial due to continued politicization of the force’s 
upper echelons. There were reports that police and army personnel suspected of being sympathetic to the 
political opposition were threatened with demotion or suspension. Authorities often did not allow detainees 
prompt or regular access to their lawyers and often informed lawyers who attempted to visit their clients 
that detainees were “not available,” especially in cases involving opposition members and civil society activ-
ists. Family members sometimes were denied access unless accompanied by an attorney (US Dept of State 
2009, 2010).
The constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary in recent years was under 
intense pressure to conform to government policies, and the government repeatedly refused to abide by 
judicial decisions. The law provides for a unitary court system consisting of headmen’s courts, chiefs’ courts, 
magistrates’ courts, the High Court, and the Supreme Court. Civil and customary law cases may be heard at 
all levels of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court. During 2009 it was reported that numerous arrests 
of MDC-T parliamentarians were politically motivated and meant to erode the MDC-T’s voting power in 
Parliament and to harass MDC-T parliamentarians. In spite of all misery, victim-friendly courts, which had 
jurisdiction over children and victims of sexual abuse, had specially trained magistrates and prosecutors and 
equipment that allow victims to testify without being seen (US Dept of State 2009, 2010).
Land seizures remained a serious problem in 2009. Constitutional amendment 17, enacted in 2005, 
transferred title of all land previously acquired for resettlement purposes to the government, prohibited 
court challenges to the acquisitions, and allowed the government to acquire any agricultural land for any 
purpose simply by publishing a notice of acquisition. In 2007 the government announced it was going to 
take action to seize the remaining 400 white-owned farms for resettlement, followed by a sharp increase in 
invasions, evictions, and arrests of farm owners and workers. In that year the SADC tribunal in Namibia2, 
in its ﬁ  rst decision since its establishment in 2000, ruled in favour of a farmer who was contesting the 
compulsory acquisition of his farm. However, in January 2008 the Zimbabwe government declared that 
2  The tribunal was set up to ensure that SADC member states, including Zimbabwe, adhere to the SADC treaty and protocols, 
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the country would be bound only by its laws and decisions of its superior courts. A year later, on August 7, 
2009, the government informed the SADC tribunal that the country was pulling out of the tribunal. Disrup-
tions at farms and seizures of property increased during 2009 and were often violent. ZANU-PF support-
ers invaded numerous farms and stole crops, farming materials, and personal property of the farmers and 
farm workers. Tens of thousands of black farm workers on white-owned farms were beaten, intimidated, 
or displaced and left without any means of subsistence (US Dept of State 2009, 2010; also ILO 2009 and 
Jongerius 2009d).
Women’s representation in politics shows signs of progress. After the 2008 elections, there were 32 
women in the 214-seat House of Assembly (15.0%), increasing from just 10% in 2004. Women won 23 of 
the 60 elected seats in the Senate, including the president of the Senate. One vice president, one deputy 
prime minister, ﬁ  ve ministers, and two governors were women. Of the 270 House and Senate elected posi-
tions, 57 were ﬁ  lled by women or 21.1%, short of the current SADC target for female representation of 
one-third (leave alone of 50% by 2015). In 2006 Rita Makarau became the ﬁ  rst woman to hold the position 
of judge-president of the High Court. Women participated in politics without legal restriction, although 
according to local women’s groups, husbands commonly directed their wives to vote for the husbands’ 
preferred candidates, particularly in rural areas. The ZANU-PF congress allotted women one-third of party 
positions and reserved 50 positions for women on the party’s 180-member central committee, which was 
one of the party’s most powerful organizations. In local government women’s representation, being 9.5% in 
2008, is lagging behind. The GPA contains a commitment to gender equality; it states to support women’s 
participation in all efforts to build a participatory democracy; for the time being these are mere words (web-
site OECD-SIGI; website allAfrica; US Dept of State 2010; website IPU; website Gender Links).
In spite of the oppression of the last decade, Zimbabwe’s civil society has remained strong and resilient. 
A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate in the country, investigating and pub-
lishing their ﬁ  ndings on human rights cases. Domestic NGOs (or Civil Society Organisations, CSOs) work 
on human rights and democracy issues; election observation; constitutional and electoral reform; increasing 
poor women’s access to the courts; raising awareness of the abuse of children; conducting civic education; 
preserving the independence of the judiciary; and combating torture, arbitrary detention, and restrictions 
on freedom of the press and assembly. Major domestic independent human rights organizations include the 
Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA), and Students Solidarity Trust. Women are on the forefront in CSOs. Women’s organisations such as Page ● 22
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Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), the Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association (ZWLA), the Women’s 
Coalition and Women’s Action Group (WAG) have played prominent roles in many ﬁ  elds (Amnesty Inter-
national 2007)3. In July 2009 Mugabe criticized NGOs, questioning the advisability of having them. In 2009 
police arrested or detained NGO members, often in connection with demonstrations or marches; many 
were beaten during arrest and tortured while in custody. Even representatives of international and foreign 
NGOs were harassed (US Dept of State 2010).
The law provides criminal penalties for ofﬁ  cial corruption; however, the government in 2009 did not 
implement the law effectively and impartially. A government-appointed Anticorruption Commission was 
established in 2005 but had yet to register any notable accomplishments. Ofﬁ  cials frequently engaged in 
corrupt practices with impunity. The government continued to allow individuals aligned with top ofﬁ  cials 
to seize land not designated for acquisition (US Dept of State 2009, 2010). According to the World Bank’s 
worldwide governance indicators (WGI), the comparative position of Zimbabwe after 1998 worsened on 
the six indicators used; on all six the country in 2008 was in the world’s lowest 10% of countries, with the 
very worst scores on regulatory quality rule of law (World Bank 2009c). Around the turn of the century the 
major collapse in the formal economy created a huge parallel economy (Bond 2007); indeed, calculations 
have conﬁ  rmed that Zimbabwe’s large shadow economy in 2002-03 covered over 63% of the ofﬁ  cial GDP 
(Schneider 2005).
The constitution and law provide that no person can be deprived of fundamental rights, such as the 
right to life, liberty, and security of person, based on one’s race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, 
color, creed, gender, or disability. However, discrimination against women persisted and the physical integ-
rity of women is not sufﬁ  ciently protected. Violence against women, particularly domestic violence, is very 
common and occurs across society. In two-thirds of cases of violence against women, the perpetrator is 
the woman’s husband, partner or ex-husband; half of the cases involve both physical and sexual violence. 
The law makes rape and nonconsensual sex between married partners a crime; however, few cases of rape, 
especially spousal rape, were reported to authorities: rape victims typically do not ﬁ  le complaints for fear 
of social stigma. Moreover, there is no speciﬁ  c legislation against domestic violence and the police is not 
prepared to investigate. In fact, police often fails to respond to women’s complaints. Furthermore, the 
Zimbabwean courts have no power to order a violent spouse to leave the marital home. In November 2009 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UNICEF, and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) 
3  All women human rights defenders interviewed from across Zimbabwe by Amnesty International (2007) repeatedly noted the 
problems they faced in feeding their families, meeting school fees and paying for medical care for themselves and their family 
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announced plans to set up centers for survivors of sexual abuse to access medical and psychological help. 
The announcement came in response to a survey that found that the country’s instability had led to an in-
crease of sexual abuse. More than half of the 1,900 persons interviewed, both male and female, reported 
that they had been raped. Nearly half of the respondents said they did not know what to do to cope with 
rape experiences. In 2009 there continued to be reports that women and children were sexually exploited 
in towns along the borders with South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia (website OECD-SIGI; 
US Dept of State 2010).
Despite laws aimed at enhancing women’s rights and countering certain discriminatory traditional prac-
tices, women remained disadvantaged in society. Economic dependency and prevailing social norms pre-
vented rural women in particular from combating societal discrimination. Despite legal prohibitions, women 
remained vulnerable to entrenched customary practices, including pledging young women to marry part-
ners not of their choosing and forcing widows to marry the brothers of their late spouses. The customary 
Family Code grants very few rights to women. There are three types of marriage: civil marriage, registered 
customary marriage and unregistered customary marriage. The latter predominates in rural areas, where it is 
the union in 80% of households. Polygamy is accepted by the traditional religions practised by over half of 
the Zimbabwean population; about one in ten women lives in polygamous union. Such marriages are three 
times more frequent in rural communities than in urban areas. Polygamy is prohibited in civil marriages, 
which appears to be a factor in the high incidence of unregistered customary marriages (website OECD-
SIGI; US Dept of State 2010).
Civil marriage grants spouses equal rights in regard to parental authority. However, in general, many 
women lack awareness of their rights and husbands tend to exercise sole authority within the family, par-
ticularly in rural areas where customary marriage dominates and women are considered as perpetual minors. 
Inheritance rights depend on the type of marriage. Under the rules of customary marriage, widows cannot 
inherit their husband’s property and daughters can inherit from their father only if there are no sons in the 
family. In some cases, sons who inherit the family home immediately sell it and evict their widowed moth-
ers. Only the small minority of women who were married in civil ceremonies have the legal right to inherit 
property from their husbands. The civil liberties of women in Zimbabwe are severely restricted by tradition. 
In principle, the law guarantees women’s freedom of movement, but in practice, most men exercise almost 
constant control over their wives’ actions. The custom of the lobola, a dowry paid by the bridegroom to Page ● 24
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the father of the bride, plays a signiﬁ  cant role in perpetuating this type of conﬁ  nement: a man who has 
“bought” his wife thinks he can treat her as he pleases (website OECD-SIGI; US Dept of State 2010).
Zimbabwean women encounter signiﬁ  cant discrimination in ownership rights. Access to land is essential 
for women; their survival often depends on growing subsistence crops. Yet, women are rarely land owners. 
If land belongs to a village, customary law applies and land ownership is reserved for heads of households 
– typically men. Women are effectively excluded from ownership. In the event of divorce, women auto-
matically lose this right of use. Widows are not entitled to inherit their husband’s land. The law recognizes 
women’s right to own property other than land independently of their husbands or fathers; however, many 
women continued to be unaware of these property and inheritance rights. All women, whether single or 
married, are entitled to own property, which they retain if they do marry or subsequently divorce. Accord-
ing to civil law divorce proceedings, a woman’s contribution to the household is taken into account when 
dividing the couple’s joint property. Legislation allows women to have access to bank loans, but banks often 
ask for a husband’s consent or for guarantees that women are rarely able to provide. As a result, ﬁ  nancial 
institutions grant very few loans to women. Some credit institutions are successfully targeting women and 
there are increasing numbers of women-only savings clubs, which give women access to ﬁ  nancing (website 
OECD-SIGI).
NGOs in 2009 reported that women experienced economic discrimination, including in access to em-
ployment, credit, pay, and owning or managing businesses. Active women’s rights groups like those men-
tioned earlier concentrated on improving women’s knowledge of their legal rights, increasing their eco-
nomic power, combating domestic violence, and protecting women against domestic violence and sexual 
transmission of HIV/AIDS. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Gender and Community Development, 
established in 2005, continued its efforts to advance women’s rights. The ministry, through collaboration 
with local NGOs, continued training workshops for traditional leaders in rural communities to create more 
awareness of women’s issues (US Dept of State 2010). 
Child abuse, including incest, infanticide, child abandonment, and rape, continued to be a serious prob-
lem area during 2009. Anecdotal evidence suggested that a relative or someone who lived with the child was 
the most common abuser. Girl Child Network reported that girls believed to be virgins were at risk of rape 
due to the belief among some that having sex with a virgin would cure men of HIV and AIDS. In 2008 
UNICEF and the government launched the “Stand Up and Speak Out” child abuse awareness and preven-
tion campaign. In October 2009 the NGO Plan Zimbabwe and the Ministry of Education, Sport, Art, and Page ● 25
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Culture launched the “Learn Without Fear” campaign, aimed at eradicating child abuse in schools. The 
campaign began after a study found that many children had been victims of unreported sexual and physical 
abuse by their teachers and peers (website OECD-SIGI; US Dept of State 2010). 
Trafﬁ  cking remains a serious problem. Children were trafﬁ  cked domestically and regionally into farms 
or cities for agricultural labour, domestic servitude, and commercial sexual exploitation. Reports suggested 
that those children in desperate economic circumstances, especially those in families headed by children, 
were most at risk. Women and children were reportedly trafﬁ  cked for sexual exploitation in towns across 
the borders with the four neighboring countries. In recent years women and girls were lured to South 
Africa, China, Egypt, the UK, Canada, and Zambia with false employment offers that resulted in invol-
untary domestic servitude or commercial sexual exploitation. Trafﬁ  ckers were typically independent busi-
nesspersons who were part of small networks of local criminal groups that facilitated trafﬁ  cking within 
the country, as well as into South Africa or other surrounding countries. Trafﬁ  cked citizens often laboured 
for months without pay in South Africa before their “employers” reported them to authorities as illegal 
immigrants. The use of child labourers, especially as farm workers or domestic servants, was common in 
the country, often with the complicity of family members (US Dept of State 2010). Especially the border 
between South Africa and Zimbabwe is fertile ground for criminal gangs specializing in human trafﬁ  cking, 
and migration repeatedly serves as a camouﬂ  age for trafﬁ  ckers (NN 2009a). Some children were trafﬁ  cked 
internally to work as farm workers or domestic servants. The current inclusive government demonstrates 
interest in combating trafﬁ  cking; however, according to the US State Dept in 2009 it did not devote suf-
ﬁ  cient resources to investigating and prosecuting cases (US Dept of State 2010). A recent governmental 
draft policy report afﬁ  rms that Zimbabwe does not have coordinated anti-trafﬁ  cking policies, legislation or 
programmes. Obviously the government is willing to intensify existing cooperation with IOM in this respect 
(Republic of Zimbabwe 2010). 
For 2009 the Gender Gap Index of the World Economic Forum ranked Zimbabwe no. 96 out of 134 
countries, while in 2006 it was in 76th position out of 115 countries.4 On all four yardsticks used, the coun-
try’s 2009 rankings were lower than their 2006 equivalents: no. 82 on (the position of women in) economic 
participation and opportunity, no. 103 on educational attainment, no. 125 on health and survival, while for 
political empowerment the country was to be found on the 83rd spot (Hausmann et al 2009). Finally, it is 
worth mentioning that the SIGI Gender Equality and Social Institutions Index overall ranked Zimbabwe 
4  To be included in this index, a country must have data available for a minimum of 12 indicators out of 14 variables; Zimbabwe 
had one indicator missing (Hausmann et al 2009, 7). Page ● 26
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no. 72 of 102 countries in 2008. On the family code sub-index, the country ranked 80th of 112 countries, 
on women’s civil liberties no. 84 of 122 countries and on women’s ownership rights no. 111 of 122 (website 
OECD-SIGI).
2.1.3. Prospects
While for most of the 14 countries under scrutiny in the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project their eco-
nomic and social prospects are heavily dependent on international developments, that may be channeled 
and adopted through national policies, the prospects of Zimbabwe will rest primarily on developments in 
the internal political arena, be it inﬂ  uenced by international political and economic forces. Its economic 
potential is large: large mineral deposits (platinum, chromium, coal, copper, nickel, gold, iron ore), abundant 
wildlife and world-class tourist attractions including the Victoria Falls, one of the seven wonders of the 
world, and a well-educated labour force. At the same time the obstacles to a recovery of tourism, bringing 
nearly one million visitors in 1999 to the country but less than 100,000 in 2008, are telling. The “new” tour-
ists lifting incoming tourism to 365,000 in 2009 are mainly low-spending Chinese and visitors from other 
African countries staying with relatives. Obviously European and North American tourists have decided to 
stay away. Mugabe’s anti-western rhetoric, the fear to become like victims of the widespread abuse of hu-
man and property rights, the innumerable police roadblocks on the major national roads well-known from 
TV broadcasts, they remain main deterrents to international tourism (NN 2009b; Bloch 2009). Moreover, 
in a report as of 2007 the Zimbabwe Conservation Task Force estimated that 60% of Zimbabwe’s wildlife 
has died since 2000 due to poaching and deforestation. The report warns that the loss of life combined with 
widespread deforestation is potentially disastrous for the tourist industry (US Dept of State 2010; wikipedia 
Zimbabwe)
The short-term economic improvements seem promising. The IMF hails Zimbabwe’s ﬁ  nance minister 
Tendai Biti (MDC) and talks about “a nascent economic recovery”. The country’s real GDP is estimated to 
have grown by 4% in 2009, following a decrease of 14% in 2008. Strong growth was reported in manufac-
turing and services. Price stability has been restored, and hyperinﬂ  ation turned into a considerable amount 
of deﬂ  ation: in December 2009, the ofﬁ  cially reported 12-month consumer price index (CPI) index in USD 
terms had fallen by 8%. Budget revenue and grants increased from less than 4% of GDP in 2008 to USD 
975 million or 22% of GDP in 2009, mainly on account of indirect taxes. A main point of worry remains 
the external position of Zimbabwe. The current account deﬁ  cit is estimated to have widened from 24% of 
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increase, to 162% of GDP by end-2009. In March 2010, the IMF granted a ﬁ  rst major loan of about USD 
100 million, largely spent on infrastructure repairs. While most international donors remain cautious and are 
waiting for true democratic reforms, commercial forecasts expect GDP per capita growth in 2010 of 10 to 
15% (IMF 2010; websites allAfrica news, afrol News, Dzirutwe 2010). 
Yet, the economic regeneration of the country remains, as all objective “Zimbabwe watchers” state, 
fragile and mainly dependent on the return of political stability and the containment of political violence. In 
the course of 2009 and in 2010, such violence may have somewhat eased, but the Government of National 
Unity (GNU) is far from crisis-prone and in practice the ZANU-PF squadron often seems to dominate. 
Its record in protecting workers and workers’ rights is not yet very convincing. Most recently according 
to the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the country’s independent trade union confedera-
tion, the GNU seems unable to keep a halt to harassment, intimidation and violence against unionists. In 
particular in rural areas ZCTU union leaders still have good reasons to live in fear. For instance, Gertrude 
Hambira, the general secretary of the General Agriculture and Plantation Workers’ Union (GAPWUZ), 
had to ﬂ  y into hiding when in February 2010 armed police raided the GAPWUZ ofﬁ  ces. In October 2009 
Lovemore Matombo, president of ZCTU, was once again arrested. For the time being, in ZCTU feelings 
of disappointment concerning government participation of the MDC tend to dominate (website ACTSA; 
Davis 2010; see also our section 2.4.2). These feelings are fuelled by many events and policy statements; for 
instance when two government ministers, including ﬁ  nance minister Biti, suggest that the current Labour 
Act “would be changed to reﬂ  ect the prevailing economic environment” as to create more ﬂ  exibility in the 
labour market. In particular this claim has provoked a ﬁ  erce reaction from the side of the ZCTU, suggest-
ing that the GNU is heading for a showdown with workers (Gumede 2010) – fully understandable, as the 
ministerial claim conﬂ  icts strongly with the report of a 2009 ILO Commission of Inquiry recommending 
that the country’s labour law should be brought in line with the ILO Conventions (see sections 2.4.1 and 
2.4.2), and as improvements in labour law have still stayed away.
Hopeful signs should be mentioned too. They may particularly be found in the restoration of the free-
dom of press, at least to some extent (see our next section), and in some developments in education (see 
section 2.7.2). A promising development has deﬁ  nitely been the dialogue unfolded at a high level meeting by 
the end of April, 2010 between representatives of the women’s wings of the three political parties, ZANU-
PF, MDC-T and MDC-M. This meeting, joined by eminent African women leaders, resulted in a resolution 
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will meet on a regular basis to discuss and agree to take the appropriate actions all issues pertaining to the 
well-being of the Zimbabwean women and the Zimbabwean nation”. The resolution is to be integrated in 
the work of the Organ of National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI5) (Robinson 2010a, b).
2.2. Communication
Adequate communication facilities are absolutely essential for the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project. 
Zimbabwe has one of the best telephone systems in Africa, but it now suffers from poor maintenance (CIA 
World Factbook). The coverage of ﬁ  xed telephone connections per 1,000 of the population has increased 
modestly, from about 200 in 2000 to 280 or 3.5 million main lines in use in 2008 (World Bank 2009a; CIA 
World Factbook). By contrast the number of cellular phones in use, which was only 21 per 1,000 in 2000, 
has grown rapidly to 138 per 1,000 or over 1,6 million cell phones in 2008 (CIA World Factbook). In 2008 
mobile cellular networks covered 75% of the population (World Bank 2009a). International phone voice 
trafﬁ  c was quite limited, with 1.9 minutes per person per month (World Bank 2009a). 
In 2007 Mugabe signed into law the Interception of Communications Act (ICA) to provide for the 
interception and monitoring of any communication (including telephone, postal mail, e-mail, and Internet 
trafﬁ  c) in the course of transmission through a telecommunication, postal, or other system in the country. 
Civil liberties advocates criticized the ICA as repressive legislation that allows the government to stiﬂ  e free-
dom of speech and to target opposition and civil society activists (US Dept of State 2010).
According to the CIA World Factbook, in 2008 the share of Internet users in Zimbabwe –in 2000 
only 4 per 1,000-- had grown to 119 per 1,000 of the population, as it noted 1,421,000 Internet users; the 
World Bank (2009a) indicated 114 per 1,000 coverage. In may be assumed that in 2010 about one in eight 
Zimbabweans has regular access to the Internet. With 8 per 1,000 in 2008, the number of ﬁ  xed Internet 
subscribers remained quite low; 17% of them were broadband subscribers (World Bank 2009a). Internet use 
in Zimbabwe clearly concentrates at work, in schools and in Internet cafés. By 2009, the country had 29,100 
Internet hosts, and by December 2008 the low level of 0.6 secure Internet servers per 1 million people 
(CIA World Factbook; World Bank 2009a). As the Internet has remained unrestricted, many Zimbabweans 
use to this medium to access online news sites set up by independent, often exiled, journalists (wikipedia 
Zimbabwe).
5  The ONHRI consists of three members, each one a member of one of the three political parties to the GPA, and Ministers 
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An overview of women’s work and employment in Zimbabwe
For 2008, the incidence of personal computers (PCs) in Zimbabwe was estimated at 7.6% -- not that 
low and even nearly four times the sub-Saharan average (World Bank 2009a). Here too, the regular use of 
computers, at work, in schools and in Internet cafés will most likely even be higher, especially among the 
young generation. 
In 2009, the government continued to harass, assault, and arrest journalists. The Ministry of Media, In-
formation, and Publicity (MMIP) continued to restrict freedom of speech, particularly of those making or 
publicizing comments critical of Mugabe. The ICA continued to be used to monitor speech and to punish 
those who criticized the government. The extremely broad Ofﬁ  cial Secrets Act makes it a crime to divulge 
any information acquired in the course of ofﬁ  cial duties. Under authority of the Ofﬁ  cial Secrets Act, the 
Public Order and Security Act (POSA), or the Criminal Law Act, the government arrested individuals for 
criticizing Mugabe in public. In 2009 government continued to use the Access to Information and Privacy 
Protection Act (AIPPA) to serve as the primary justiﬁ  cation to control media content and licensing of 
journalists. The main provisions of the law give the government extensive powers to control the media and 
suppress free speech by requiring the registration of journalists and prohibiting the “abuse of free expres-
sion.” A number of independent newspapers, including the Daily News, the nation’s leading newspaper, 
had been shut down since the enactment of AIPPA in 2002. In 2009 the MMIP controlled the state-run 
media. Government-controlled media generally portrayed the activities of ZANU-PF ofﬁ  cials positively, 
portrayed other parties and antigovernment groups negatively, and downplayed events or information that 
reﬂ  ected adversely on the government. High-ranking ZANU-PF ofﬁ  cials, including Mugabe, used the me-
dia to threaten violence against critics of the government. The three main independent domestic weekly 
newspapers, The Zimbabwean, the Zimbabwe Independent, and the Standard, continued to operate despite threats 
and pressure from the government. The independent newspapers continued to criticize the government 
and ZANU-PF, but they also exercised some self-censorship due to government intimidation (US Dept of 
State 2010; website CPJ).
Radio remains the principal medium of public communication, particularly for the rural majority. The 
government controls all domestic radio stations through the state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings. 
The popularity of independent short-wave and medium-wave radio broadcasts to the country continues to 
grow; government spokesmen and women regularly feel the need to denounce these radio stations (US Dept 
of State 2010). The ownership of television sets is, with an estimated 31% of the population (World Bank Page ● 30
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2009c), rather limited. The government controlled the only domestically based TV station, the Zimbabwean 
Broadcasting Corporation (US Dept of State 2010). 
In the course of 2009 and in 2010 press freedom was restored to some extent. In 2009 the deputy minis-
ter of MMIP stated that the frequency spectrum allocated to the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory 
Authority allowed for over 30 commercial radio and an additional four television stations. The minister of 
ﬁ  nance removed the 40% import tax on all foreign newspapers imposed by ZANU-PF in June 2008. Several 
newspapers published in South Africa subsequently began circulating in Zimbabwe. The removal of the tax 
encouraged a number of Zimbabweans to publish newspapers from outside the country. These included the 
Zim Star and the News Leader (US Dept of State 2010). In July 2009 the government allowed CNN and BBC 
ﬁ  lm crews back into the country. However, foreign journalists continued to report that government agents 
followed them and prevented them from covering certain events (US Dept of State 2010). In May 2010 the 
Zimbabwe Media Commission, envisaged in the GPA, ﬁ  nally started to function, and granted publishing 
licenses to four daily newspapers, including NewsDay, the direct successor of the Daily News (NN 2010). 
Yet, until May 2010 government refused to open the airways to private TV or community radio stations (US 
Dept of State 2010; NN 2010).
2.3.  The sectoral labour market structure
2.3.1.  Formal and informal employment
Because Zimbabwe’s economy in the 2000s went into complete disarray, reliable recent ﬁ  gures on the 
sectoral labour market structure are totally lacking. We are not able to produce the kind of Table 2, showing 
employment by employment status and gender over a number of years, as presented in the other DECI-
SIONS FOR LIFE country reports. We can only show a table reﬂ  ecting the situation in 1999, hopefully 
indicating the contours of an industry structure that may show up again after some years of economic and 
social recovery. In this context it needs to be recollected that in 1999 already years of structural adjustment 
policies had passed, developing into the country’s notorious economic “plunge”. Moreover, the ﬁ  gures may 
suggest preciseness that at the time was already missing.Page ● 31
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Table 2. Employment by industry and gender, Zimbabwe, 1999
all male female
x 1,000 % x 1,000 % x 1,000 %
agriculture, forestry, ﬁ  shing 2,710 58.1 1,146 48.0 1,564 68.6
mining, construction 173 3.7 162 6.9 11 0.5
manufacturing 255 5.5 158 6.6 97 4.3
transport 89 1.9 87 3.6 2 0.1
services 442 9.5 168 7.0 274 12.0
education 98 2.1 75 3.1 23 1.0
government 194 4.2 69 2.9 125 5.5
other 705 15.1 521 21.8 184 8.0
Total 4,666 100 2,386 100 2,280 100
Source: authors’ calculations based on ILO Laborsta
Of the total population, according to national statistics as reported to the ILO by 1999 4,666,000 
persons were counted as economically active (the share of the population aged 15-64 in employment or 
registered unemployed), of which 4,666,000 persons employed and 297,000 ofﬁ  cially unemployed. As for 
gender, 2,280,000 women were employed, 48.8% of the labour force. Compared with the total population 
of Zimbabwe in this age category, for 1999 estimated at 3,235,000 men and 3,452,000 women, the country’s 
Labour Participation Rate (LPR) or Employment-to-Population ratio (EPOP) could be calculated at 69.8% 
(MDG Indicator 1.5). This might have implied a position in the lower middle ranks among the 14 countries 
in our project. With respectively 73.7% for males and 66.0% for females, the female LPR was 90% of the 
male rate (women to men parity). Yet, by 1999 these ﬁ  gures were already beset with uncertainties, which 
have increased since. 
Anyway, in the 1999 national statistics 40% of all employed were classiﬁ  ed as employers, (paid) employ-
ees and own-account workers, and 60% were contributing and unpaid family workers. Among females, these 
shares were respectively less than one quarter (23%) and over three in four (77%), against among males 
55% and 45%. Of 1,835,000 persons at the time classiﬁ  ed as employers, (paid) employees and own-account 
workers, 1,316,000 or 71% was in paid employment; the other 519,000 were employers and own-account 
workers. A rough estimate of the amount of employers comes at 100,000, implying that the formal sector 
at large covered some 1,416,000 people. Women were largely overrepresented in informal labour. By 1999, 
293,000 women were classiﬁ  ed as paid employees, only 22.3% of all in paid employment, and slightly less 
than 13% of all females employed. By contrast, the 1,023,000 men in paid employment made up 43% of all 
males employed (all data: authors’ calculations based on ILO Laborsta). Page ● 32
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In the 2000s regular employment in Zimbabwe has rapidly diminished, and formal employment rela-
tions decreased more than proportionally. In the early 2000s, formal jobs were increasingly scarce; even 
when such jobs could be found, their pay was usually so out of kilter with even the most basic costs of 
urban living, as inﬂ  ation swiftly ate away even massive, but far too occasional, pay hikes, that they could no 
longer be relied upon for survival (Potts 2006b). Most likely formal employment in the public service has 
been subject to heavy cuts. In 2009 the Minister of Education testiﬁ  ed that the education sector accounted 
for 50% of public servants, accounting for 80,000 teachers (ILO 2009, 112). This would imply that, com-
pared with table 2, the number of teachers between 1999 and 2009 had decreased by 18,000, and the size 
of (formal employment in) the public sector at large had shrunk by about 130,000. According to the last 
available ofﬁ  cial ﬁ  gures, formal (paid) employment fell from 1,316,000 in 1999 to 1,071,000 in 2002, or by 
19%; male paid employment fell to 815,000 or by 20%, female employment decreased comparatively less, 
by 13% to 256,000 (ILO Laborsta). After 2002 this decrease most likely has speeded up, also inﬂ  uenced 
by emigration. The economic meltdown and repressive politics have led to a massive ﬂ  ood of refugees 
into neighbouring countries. By mid-2007 already an estimated 3.4 million Zimbabweans, a quarter of the 
population, had ﬂ  ed abroad; some 3 million of these went to South Africa (wikipedia Zimbabwe). A recent 
ofﬁ  cial estimate came to about four million Zimbabweans living abroad, the majority having left in the past 
ﬁ  ve to six years (Republic of Zimbabwe 2010; see next section). 
The ZCTU trade union confederation estimated for 2009 that approximately 3 million persons worked 
in the informal sector, and about 600,000 in the formal sector. The dollarisation in April 2009 may have 
resulted in a further growth of informal work, as quite some employers argued that they were no longer 
able to pay wages because of this measure (ITUC 2009; Jongerius 2009c,d). For 2008 the ILO also reported 
that four of ﬁ  ve jobs in the country were in the informal sector (US Dept of State 2010). These estimates 
would imply that the informal sector in the course of the 2000s lost about some 300,000 workers and the 
formal sector about 720,000, bringing the country’s total LPR on about 60%. If approximately correct, the 
estimate of the global gender gap report of the World Economic Forum that women recently accounted 
for about 43% of the labour force (Hausmann et al 2009) would imply about 1,550,000 women employed 
-- about 730,000 or one-third of all women less than a decade earlier. However, the reader should be aware 
that currently majorities of Zimbabweans, notably those informally employed, can only ﬁ  nd work from 
which they derive an income for a few hours per day or even per week. This will likely be true for women 
even more than for men. Estimates on the recent incidence of this mostly deplorable state of underemploy-Page ● 33
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ment vary between 80% and 94% of Zimbabwe’s population aged 15-64 (ITUC 2009; US Dept of State 
2010; Jongerius 2009b).6
According to the ﬁ  gures presented in Table 2 at the turn of the century nearly 60% of the total labour 
force was engaged in agriculture: nearly half of all males and nearly seven of 10 females employed. Vari-
ous indications suggest that throughout the 2000s the absolute amount of those working in agriculture has 
remained at the same level, at about 2.7 million, bringing the share of agriculture in total employment at 
75%. This lines up with the conclusion of the US State Dept that about 75% of the population will rely 
directly or indirectly on agriculture for their livelihood; the State Dept adds that nearly half live by subsist-
ence agriculture. Currently one-fourth of the formally employed, or about 150,000, are estimated to be 
engaged directly in agricultural activities. Generally, jobs in agriculture, deﬁ  nitely in informal employment, 
provide extremely low cash income and poor working conditions and do not offer adequate worker protec-
tions. About 1.2 million women may work in agriculture, of which only about 5% in formal employment 
(US Dept of State 2010) 
In 1999, the respective shares of the industries other than agriculture in employment were roughly com-
parable with those in other sub-Saharan countries. With 12%, the share of (commercial) services in female 
employment was higher than in Angola, Mozambique and Malawi, about equal with Zambia and lower than 
in South Africa and Botswana (see the respective DECISIONS FOR LIFE country reports). Following our 
earlier estimates, about 350,000 women may currently be employed outside agriculture (half of the amount 
of ten years ago); approximately 150,000 will likely be found in services, of which about 100,000 in com-
mercial services. In 2009 the Minister of Education testiﬁ  ed that the education sector accounted for 50% 
of public servants, accounting for 80,000 teachers (ILO 2009, 112). Compared with table 2, the number of 
teachers had decreased by 18,000, whereas in 1999 they made up one-third of the public service.
2.3.2. Migration
We already noted the recent large amounts of (e)migrants (or refugees) from Zimbabwe. Temporary la-
bour migration to South Africa has long been a feature of Rhodesian and then Zimbabwean society; a 2001 
survey indicated that almost 25% of adult Zimbabweans’ parents or grandparents had worked in South 
Africa at some point in their lives. However, permanent emigration is relatively new. After that of whites 
leaving the country after independence, two waves of mass emigration of black Zimbabweans followed: the 
6  Most sources speak of “unemployment”. We tend to interpret the proportions mentioned as in majority composed by under-
employment. As Potts (2000) has pointed out for urban areas in Zimbabwe, unemployment cannot reach such extreme levels 
since there is effectively no welfare sector. Page ● 34
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ﬁ  rst, in the 1980s, after the Matabeleland massacre, and the second and largest one beginning in the 1990s, 
fuelled by the ESAP and economic decline (website Zimbabwean diaspora; Tevera and Zinyama 2002; Bloch 
2006). In 2001, in a survey of skilled Zimbabweans nearly three of ﬁ  ve (57%) gave a “great deal” of thought 
to emigration from the country – a much higher share than in South Africa, Lesotho and Botswana. Those 
aged 25-34 years had given the most consideration to the possibility of leaving the country. These outcomes 
pointed at a huge pool of potential emigrants (Tevera and Crush 2003). Two years later, only 6% of ﬁ  nal-
year college and university students surveyed had not considered moving abroad; some seven in 10 said they 
were likely to emigrate within two years of graduating, and about half thought of migrating permanently. 
Over a quarter of students had already applied for or was in the process of applying for a work permit in 
another country (Tevera 2005). The brain drain has indeed reached a dramatic magnitude, with thorough 
consequences for in particular the country’s health and education systems: see sections 2.6.2 and 2.7.2.
It has to be recognised that a large majority of emigrants shows a multitude (and mixture) of reasons 
why they leave their country, including politically persecuted, economically motivated, traders, and others 
(Bloch 2006). Yet, the nature of Zimbabwean emigration has changed in the last two decades, from in ma-
jority young job seekers in the 1990s to, since about 2005, an increase in humanitarian migrants in search 
of basic food and health care, including larger proportions of women, children and elderly (Polzer 2008). 
Around 2005 the motives for migration to South Africa were predominantly economic, whereas migration 
to the UK was more inspired by the political situation at home (Bloch 2006). The South African Mbeki 
administration considered most of the “economic” migration from Zimbabwe illegitimate and illegal, also 
as a bilateral agreement between the two countries was lacking, and following this logic its dominant re-
sponse was the arrest and deportation of undocumented refugees. Though since April 2009 the introduc-
tion of a twelve-month “special dispensation permit” by the new South African government has halted 
these deportations,7 NGOs and international organizations reported that Zimbabwean emigrants continued 
to face exploitation (Polzer 2008, 2009; US Dept of State 2010). A quite recent draft Zimbabwean paper 
of the Government of National Unity, preparing a national migration management and diaspora policy, 
acknowledges that labour migrants to notably South Africa are vulnerable to various forms of exploitation, 
including xenophobic attacks and limited access to social services, particularly health care.8 It recalls the 
7  Though in the case of South Africa the introduction of this permit is deﬁ  nitely a step forward (cf. Polzer 2009), Botswana 
continues the deportation practices. Between June 2008 – May 2009, IOM recorded 53,650 cases of Zimbabweans returnees 
(irregular migrants) from Botswana whom the organisation provided with assistance, of which 32% female (Republic of 
Zimbabwe 2010). 
8  Bloch (2006, 76-7) argues that racism and xenophobia also in the UK underlie societal structures, showing that in her sample 
of twice 500 emigrants the relation between the immigration status of Zimbabweans and their labour market position worked 
out hardly less disadvantageous in the UK compared with South Africa. Page ● 35
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wave of violence against foreign nationals –in majority Zimbabweans-- in South Africa in May 2008, and 
notes that in November 2009, scores of Zimbabwean farm workers were displaced in South Africa’s West 
Cape as a result of xenophobic attacks (Republic of Zimbabwe 2010). 
Remarkable is the large share of women in out-migration. Surveyed in 2001, a larger share of skilled 
Zimbabwean women than men (62% versus 54%) seriously considered emigration (Tevera and Crush 2003). 
A factual 2005 survey found that 44% of Zimbabwean migrants were female, an exception to the migration 
to South Africa from other SADC countries that was and is –like migration in general-- heavily male-domi-
nated. This survey also found that many migrants were household heads (28%) or spouses / partners (13%), 
and that most migrants were married (58%) – pointing at a broadening of emigration (Tevera and Chikanda 
2005). Overall, female migrants are older and more educated than male migrants, and more likely to be mar-
ried. Many migrant women interviewed were independent agents in migration decision-making, rather than 
deferring to male partners or parents, and had deﬁ  ed resistance from families and communities. Most were 
main household breadwinners who left the country seeking an economic livelihood to support themselves 
and their children, as well as elderly parents, siblings, and extended family members. The interviewees all 
described poverty, hardship, and a low quality of life as the main reasons for migrating, with in particular 
for the Zimbabwean women the impossibility to ﬁ  nd a job. Though these “push” factors dominated, (per-
ceived) job opportunities in South Africa acted as a “pull” factor (Lefko-Everett 2007). 
2.4.  National legislation and labour relations
2.4.1. Legislation
Zimbabwe has ratiﬁ  ed the eight core ILO Labour Conventions, i.e. no’s 29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138 
and 182 -- for what it currently is worth. An ILO Commission of Inquiry in 2009 concluded that “that 
there was systematic, and even systemic, violation of the Conventions in the country” (vii). Zimbabwe was 
one of two countries the ILO Application of Standards Committee in 2008 criticized regarding the imple-
mentation of ILO Convention 87, which deals with freedom of association. The committee called on the 
government to halt arrests, detentions, and threats, and criticized it for refusing to appear before the com-
mittee for two consecutive years to face the allegations. The Labour Relations Act (LRA) gives private sector 
workers freedom of association, the right to elect their own representatives, and to join unions without prior 
authorisation. It allows for multiple unions per industry, provided that each is registered with the Ministry of Page ● 36
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Labour and Social Welfare. The LRA gives the Registrar the power to supervise the election of ofﬁ  cers of 
workers’ and employers’ organisations, to cancel or postpone elections and to change the venue of an elec-
tion. The 2005 Labour Amendment Bill eliminated previous public sector worker rights and excluded such 
employees from protection under labour laws, placing them instead under the Public Service Act, which 
does not provide for the right to form and belong to trade unions, collective bargaining, strikes, or alterna-
tive dispute resolution mechanisms. These restrictions, however, were not enforced in practice, and public 
sector employees participated in unions and professional organizations. Some, particularly teachers and 
medical professionals, mounted increasingly vocal lobbies for improved wages and conditions during 2009; 
however, union leaders and members were harassed, arrested, and beaten during that year. The government 
also restricted union activity indirectly by deﬁ  ning all senior employees as managers even though such em-
ployees did not enjoy beneﬁ  ts commensurate to the title. Employees in positions designated as managerial 
were excluded from general union membership (ITUC 2009; ILO 2009; US Dept of State 2010).
The LRA recognises the right to collective bargaining. However, Articles 25, 79 and 81 of the Act give 
the Minister of Labour the power to approve collective bargaining agreements, register and publish them 
– contrary to promises made by the government at the International Labour Conference in June 2004 that 
these Articles would be repealed. The Act also states that collective bargaining agreements should provide 
for measures to combat workplace violence; the ZCTU believes this could be used to criminalise industrial 
action. Collective bargaining is not the exclusive prerogative of trade unions, as workers’ committees may 
also bargain at company level. The law encourages the creation of these committees in enterprises where 
less than 50% of workers are unionised. They exist in parallel with trade unions, hence creating the poten-
tial for employers to undermine the unions. Their role is to negotiate on shop ﬂ  oor grievances, while trade 
unions are supposed to focus on industry level issues, notably wages, and negotiate through National Em-
ployment Councils (NEC). In 2009, 45 of such NEC’s were in existence, with 45 collective agreements at 
industry level. The workers’ committees meet with representatives of the management to discuss workplace 
issues in a Works Council. If 50% or more of employees are union members, there is no parallel body, as the 
workers’ committee becomes the trade union committee (ITUC 2009; ILO 2009). There is a Tripartite Ne-
gotiating Forum (TNF) in existence since the late 1990s as an institution for social dialogue, but according 
to both ZCTU and employers’ representatives the Forum had never operated satisfactorily. Both workers’ 
and employers’ representatives have indicated that the economic climate of the 2000s has rendered collec-
tive bargaining ineffective, although the structures are still valid and functioning (ILO 2009, 135, 158). Page ● 37
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Although the LRA recognises the right to strike, there are many procedural hurdles, such as the fact that 
more than 50% of the employees must vote for a strike, followed by a 30-day conciliation period and pos-
sible referral to binding arbitration and then a 14-day advance notice period. As a result of all these delaying 
tactics it is practically impossible to organise a legal strike. Moreover, strikes are prohibited in essential serv-
ices. The deﬁ  nition of “essential” goes far beyond that envisaged by the ILO, and includes railway engineers, 
electricians, transport and communications’ employees, veterinary services and pharmacies. The Minister 
can decide what constitutes an essential service, and so declare that any service or industry is essential and 
thus impose a strike ban. Those taking part in an illegal strike face harsh prison sentences of up to ﬁ  ve years. 
The excessively complicated mechanisms for organising a legal strike has resulted in that many unions give 
up trying to organise a legal strike and instead resort to “illegal” stoppages, stay-aways or protest actions 
(ITUC 2009; US Dept of State 2010). Representatives of the Employers’ Federation of Zimbabwe (EM-
COZ) admitted to the ILO Commission of Inquiry outlined below that in practice “it is literally impossible 
to engage in a lawful strike in Zimbabwe”, as “strikes are to be authorized by police, which never allows for 
that to happen” (ILO 2009, 120).9 
In November 2008 the ILO appointed a Commission of Inquiry to investigate complaints that worker 
rights were violated under ILO Conventions 87 and 98. In May and August 2009 the Commission visited 
Zimbabwe and met with over 300 persons including government ofﬁ  cials, leaders and members of trade un-
ions and employers’ organizations, and representatives of civil society organizations.10 On March 25, 2010, 
its report entitled “Truth, reconciliation and justice in Zimbabwe” was published (ILO 2009). It focused on 
the need for legislative reform; the cessation with immediate effect of all anti-union practices; strengthening 
of national institutions and social dialogue; training on freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
civil liberties and human rights; and the reinforcement of the rule of law and the role of the courts in Zim-
babwe: “All Zimbabweans should rise up, stand for, and uphold the responsibility to prevent future viola-
tions of human and trade union rights” (ILO 2009, 162). One month later, on 27 April, the government 
informed the Director-General of the ILO that it accepted the recommendations of the report. It said to 
welcome the guidance and support of the ILO in its implementation of the Commission’s recommenda-
9 EMCOZ  testiﬁ  ed for the ILO Commission that prior to the establishment of the inclusive government, its members also 
experienced intimidation and harassment, in particular in the context of the price control and foreign currency policies. 
EMCOZ explained that many employers had been “incarcerated for running their businesses”. The employers’ association 
considered that social dialogue was the only way forward to improve economic conditions in the country and that issues such 
as wages and salaries should be decided by involving all social partners (ILO 2009, 122). 
10  “The Commission was able to meet almost all of the government ofﬁ  cials that it had indicated it wished to meet, with the 
exception of the President of Zimbabwe, the Minister of State for National Security, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Organization (CIO) and the Commissioner of the Zimbabwe Republic Police” (!) (ILO 2009, 150). Page ● 38
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tions (ILO media website).
Of particular relevance for the young female target group of the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project is 
the following labour legislation, based on the Labour Relations Act 1985 and/or more speciﬁ  c regulations 
(website Wageindicator / Zimbabwe / mywage; ILO-Travail database; ILO Natlex):
  ● any female employee shall be granted maternity leave after at least one year of service; such leave may 
only be granted upon production of a medical certiﬁ  cate for three times for the same employer and 
only once during a 24 month period calculated from the day previous leave was granted. Paid mater-
nity leave will be granted for 98 days, and on this behalf 100% of the normal salary will be paid by the 
employer. Compulsory leave will be granted at least 21 days before conﬁ  nement;
  ● during any one year period of service, an employee, upon request and supported by a certiﬁ  cate 
signed by a registered medical practitioner, shall be granted up to 90 days sick leave on full pay;
  ● every employee shall be entitled to 24 continous hours of rest each week, either on the same day of 
every week or on a day agreed by the employer and employee;
  ● an employee shall be granted leave of absence during every public holiday and shall be paid her/his 
current remuneration for that day if it occurs on a day on which he or she would otherwise have been 
required to work. Where an employee consents to work on a public holiday he or she shall be paid 
not less than twice the current remuneration for that day whether or not that day is one on which they 
would otherwise have been required to work.
Labour legislation prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace, and an employer may be held liable for 
civil remedies if found to be in violation of provisions against “unfair labour practices,” including sexual 
harassment. However, penalties for these violations are not speciﬁ  ed in the law. Though women commonly 
faced workplace sexual harassment, government enforcement was not effective, and there were no reports 
of any prosecutions during 2009 (US Dept of State 2010).
2.4.2.  Labour relations and wage-setting
Already in the 1920s, the ﬁ  rst trade union of black workers emerged, but it dissolved after some years. 
In 1945, a nationwide strike of black railway workers led to the formation of a number of unions. Mas-
sive strike activity followed in 1948, 1954, and 1956. In 1959, the Industrial Conciliation Act recognized 
for the ﬁ  rst time African unions. Nevertheless, white workers had more voting power than black workers 
in the industrial councils, registration was difﬁ  cult, and unions were prohibited from becoming involved in 
political activities. Until independence it remained difﬁ  cult for black unions to become established. In 1979, Page ● 39
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the Constitution guaranteed freedom of association and the right to form and belong to trade unions. In 
1981, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was formed as the national union confederation, 
through the merger of the six union federations existing at the time. The merger had the support and “deep 
interest” of the government. Initially, the ZCTU was closely aligned to the government and the ZANU–
PF movement, though up to 200 strikes were organized during the ﬁ  rst two years of independence. The 
Minimum Wages Act, 1980 aimed to tackle discontent with wages by setting out sectoral minimum wages. 
Other labour legislation enacted in 1980 and 1981, and incorporated into the LRA 1985, equally included 
governmental involvement in labour relations (ILO 2009).
From the mid-1980s, the relationship between the Mugabe administration government and the ZCTU 
came under pressure, with the union confederation challenging the economic policies of the government. 
The ZCTU supported a protest by students in 1989, during which Morgan Tsvangirai, its secretary general, 
was arrested. Tensions grew further with the introduction of the ESAP in 1991. An ofﬁ  cial government 
document recently stated: “The outcry by both the urban and rural population as a result of ESAP induced 
hardships is well documented in the many evaluations of this ﬁ  rst reform program” (GOZ 2009, 2). The 
government began to use the Law and Order Maintenance Act in relation to protests against labour law re-
forms and free-market policies in 1992. In 1994, there were strikes in the post and telecom, health, banking, 
construction and insurance sectors. In 1995 the ZCTU launched a publication arguing against the ESAP. In 
1996 teachers, nurses, and junior doctors went on strike over salary issues. 1997 witnessed widespread strike 
activity of in particular GAPWUZ, the farm workers’ union. In 1998, further industrial action, including a 
general strike, ended with armed intervention. In 1999, as noted, the labour movement joined with CSOs 
to form the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In the 2000s, police, security forces and Central 
Intelligence Organization (CIO) operatives went on to intimidate, harass and arrest ZCTU ofﬁ  cers and 
members as well as to disturb ZCTU union meetings. Union premises were repeatedly searched. Until 2009 
May Day celebrations across the country were systematically disrupted. The ZCTU president and general 
secretary have been assaulted and tortured (ILO 2009). The ILO Commission of Inquiry mentioned earlier 
stated that “Individual trade union members from throughout the country spoke of a strong sense of fear, 
of being unsafe and victimized, and an overriding threat of violence and harassment”. Some union mem-
bers stated that incidents of harassment and intimidation had reduced since the formation of the inclusive 
government; yet, the Commission reported that unionists were often still fearful and felt threatened on the 
basis of their union membership (ILO 2009, 97, 104).Page ● 40
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In 2009 the 36 unions afﬁ  liated to the ZCTU had just over 250,000 members (ITUC website; US Dept 
of State 2010). According to ZCTU estimates in 2009 about 65% of industries in the formal sector were 
organised. Starting from the estimated 600,000 persons employed in the formal sector, union density was 
just over 40% (US Dept of State 2010) – an impressive record at the backdrop of the situation of the last 
decade, making it extremely difﬁ  cult for ZCTU members to carry out union activities (ITUC 2009). The 
ILO Commission of Inquiry stated that it “saw a clear pattern of arrests, detentions, violence and torture 
of trade union leaders and members by the security forces coinciding with ZCTU nationwide events, in-
dicating some centralized direction to the security forces to take such action and a clear pattern of control 
over ZCTU trade union gatherings through the application of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). 
It noted the systematic targeting of ZCTU ofﬁ  cials and members, particularly in rural areas, involving sig-
niﬁ  cant violence and anti-union discrimination in employment, in what appeared to be a calculated attempt 
to intimidate and threaten ZCTU members” (2009, vii-viii). The ZCTU stated for the ILO Commission 
that its resources had been “depleted” by the cost of the legal fees, bail ﬁ  nes, provision of food to detained 
unionists, transport for lawyers and ofﬁ  cials searching for those detained in police cells around the country, 
and medical costs (2009, 127). In addition, the very limited purchasing power of most members make the 
unions receiving small amounts of membership fees; as a result, the afﬁ  liates are hardly or not able to pay 
their fees to the confederation (Jongerius 2009b). The ZCTU indicated to the ILO Commission that over-
seas donors had “rescued” the confederation by transferring money to its bank accounts (ILO 2009, 127; 
also Jongerius 2009f).
No less than about 2.1 million or 70% of the about 3 million-strong workforce of the informal sector in 
2009 had become members of the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations (ZCIEA), cre-
ated in 2004 by the ZCTU. ZCTU and ZCIEA have a formal cooperation agreement. ZCIEA’s 136 chapters 
are spread across Zimbabwe. The associations represents street vendors, service workers, artists, and many 
more, and tries to facilitate their work. One of ZCIEA’s primary goals is to ensure that government harass-
ment and brutality versus informal workers cease and that they know how to exercise their rights (website 
Solidarity Centre; Jongerius 2009b,e). 
The Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU), a government-created alternative union body, de-
signed to undermine and weaken the ZCTU, in 2009 continued to support splinter unions. In some cases Page ● 41
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ZFTU unions have coerced workers, telling them they have to join their union if they want to keep their 
jobs. However, there was no evidence that either employers or employees viewed the splinter unions as 
legitimate. They did not bargain collectively, handle worker complaints, or provide worker education, and 
according to the US Dept of State they were not very inﬂ  uential. In 2009, ZFTU fell apart in two factions 
(ITUC 2009; ILO 2009; US Dept of State 2010). 
The position of the ZIMTA teachers’ union, not afﬁ  liated with the ZCTU but supposedly having 
45,000 members, is rather unclear; in the opinion of the ZCTU-afﬁ  liated PTUZ teachers’ union, till quite 
recently ZIMTA was either a pro-government union or had beneﬁ  ted from government support. Neverthe-
less, clearly teachers being members of both unions have been seriously intimidated, harassed and tortured 
by ZANU-PF supporters in recent years, especially during election periods, among other things resulting in 
the massive closure of schools. The “Save our education” campaign run by PTUZ in 2008-09 was targeted 
in particular (ILO 2009, 106-110).
The LRA provides workers with the right to organize and permits unions to bargain collectively over 
wages and conditions of employment, and on 2009 workers exercised this right in practice; however, gov-
ernment harassment of union leaders and interference by the ZFTU sometimes made such negotiations 
difﬁ  cult. Collective bargaining agreements applied to all workers in an industry, not just union members. 
As said, public sector employees do not have the right to collective bargaining, strike, or alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms, but these restrictions were not enforced in practice. For example, the Apex Council, 
which represents civil servants, negotiated with the government over salaries (US Dept of State 2010).
Human Rights Watch (HRW) and other NGOs reported in 2009 that adults and children were subject to 
forced labour while digging for diamonds in the Marange diamond ﬁ  elds. Under the LRA, a child between 
the ages of 13 and 15 can work as an apprentice or if the work is an integral part of “a course of training or 
technical or vocational education.” The law further states that no person under 18 shall perform any work 
likely to jeopardize that person’s health, safety, or morals. The status of children between 15 and 18 years 
of age is not directly addressed, but 15 years of age remains the minimum for light work, work other than 
apprenticeship, or work associated with vocational education. In 2006, the government released the 2004 
Child Labour Report; according to this survey, nearly half (46%) of children between the ages of ﬁ  ve and 
17 were engaged in economic activity. Children worked in the agricultural sector, as domestics, in illegal 
gold and diamond mining, as street vendors, and as car-watchers. Although the government and NGOs are 
increasingly discussing the problem of child labour, concrete data on the number of cases remain difﬁ  cult to Page ● 42
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evaluate and conﬁ  rm. The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare is responsible for enforcing child labour 
laws, but it lacks personnel to carry out inspections or other monitoring (US Dept of State 2010).
2.5.  Minimum wage and poverty
2.5.1.  The statutory minimum wage
There is currently no national minimum wage. By November 2009, there were 28 sectoral minimum wages. 
They varied widely, the lowest being for domestics (USD 30 monthly), agriculture (USD 35-50), furniture (USD 
45), and rural district and urban council staff (both USD 70), followed by clothing (USD 80), catering (USD 
85), and textile, iron and steel, and mining (all USD 100). The minimum wage rate in a number of large sectors 
(civil service, engineering, commercial, security guard) was USD 150. The highest minimum wages were those 
for media workers (USD 250) and for railway artisans (USD 391) (WageIndicator / my wage website, based 
on ZCTU information). Any minimum wage is by far insufﬁ  cient to survive as the ofﬁ  cial Poverty Datum line 
already for January 2009 was set at USD 552 (The Herald, on website allAfrica news). More diplomatically, the 
US Dept of State (2010) recognized that the minimum wages did not provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family (US Dept of State 2010). Vivid accounts of the problems Zimbabwean workers encounter in 
meeting ends with current wages, can be found on the WageIndicator/ my wage website. For example that about a 
female primary school teacher: “Magdalene ﬁ  nds her USD 135 salary barely enough to cover fees for her three 
children, rent, food and transport, without mentioning the extended family (….) She subsidises her salary with 
money she gets from parents of the children she teaches. Pupils are required to bring USD 1 every beginning of 
the week to sustain the teachers living” (Zhangazha 2010a; also: Zhangazha 2010b, c).
The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare is responsible for enforcing the minimum wage; however, moni-
toring systems are ineffective (US Dept of State 2010). Time and time again, minimum wages need to be negoti-
ated at company level, a nearly impossible task as long as collective bargaining is widely frustrated (ITUC 2009; 
Jongerius 2009c). In early 2009, ZCTU mounted a campaign which sought to press the new government to 
consider adjusting the minimum wage rate to USD 454, thus approaching the poverty line. However, this cam-
paign has to date fallen on deaf ears (Kabange 2010). By July 1, 2009 some relief for public servants came when 
the government transformed a uniform USD 100 per month into wages and implemented large differentiated 
wage and pension increases. Yet, as a result in 2009 many social programs remained underfunded (IMF 2010). Page ● 43
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2.5.2. Poverty
During the 1980s, poverty in Zimbabwe diminished. In 1990-91, the proportion of the population 
living below the poverty line was 25%: 10% in urban areas and 31% in rural areas. In particular in the cit-
ies poverty had been on the way back. For example, in Harare’s low-income housing or high density areas 
(HDAs), where about seven in 10 of the country’s urban dwellers live, the proportion of the population 
living below the poverty line decreased from about 60% in the early 1980s to 25-30% in 1991. Most urban 
households were headed by men in formal employment in the public sector and in manufacturing and serv-
ices; often their wage would do for the household. In the 1990s the ESAP hit these households heavily. The 
rural-urban income gap was squeezed and poverty gained headway. Their new problems forced Harare’s 
low-income people to move family members back to rural areas, with negative implications for rural areas 
as the re-migrants often had no productive assets there. Moreover, the ﬂ  ow of remittances from the urban 
dwellers was reduced (Rakodi 1995; Potts 2000, 2006a; Addison and Laakso 2003). Women had to bear the 
brunt of the impact of ESAP on daily life. As inﬂ  ation rose and breadwinners lost jobs, they were reported 
to be working longer hours for paid and unpaid work than before as they spent more time ﬁ  nding ways 
to feed their families. The increased volume of work was not accompanied by improvement in household 
welfare but was just needed for survival (GOZ 2009). 
Between 1991 and 2003, the share of households living below the national Food Poverty Line (FPL), 
identiﬁ  ed as severely poor and undernourished (which means unable to meet their basic nutritional needs), 
grew from 40%, via 46% in 1996, to 58% (Bollinger et al 1999; GOZ 2003). On average, the FPL was just 
only over 60% of the Total Consumption Poverty Line (TCPL), mostly used as the national poverty thresh-
old. In ﬁ  eld research in 1997-2000 it was found that severe and chronic poverty was widespread in semi-arid 
Zimbabwe (the Natural Regions IV and V, receiving the least yearly rainfall), covering 70% of the popula-
tion living below the FPL in these areas -- home for two-thirds of the country’s population. Consequently, 
it has been estimated that at least four million people were chronically poor (Bird and Shepherd 2003). 
The initially rapid urbanization (in 1975 20% of Zimbabweans lived in urban areas, against 36% in 2005 
– UNDP 2007-2008) was not accompanied by pro-poor strategies -- by contrast, government subsidies sup-
ported household spending without any clear targeting to the poor (UNDP 2006, 127). As a result, in 2003 
72% of urban households were deﬁ  ned as poor; within HDAs, even 77% were rated poor and 57% very 
poor (Potts 2006b). It is striking to read in a joint publication as of 2003 of UN bodies, the government of 
Zimbabwe and a CSO: “Despite the seemingly timely intervention in the economy under ESAP, the decade Page ● 44
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of the 1990s generally saw a decline in economic growth and a persistence of the structural problems of 
high poverty and inequality”; the publication goes on to note that the proportion of the population below 
the TCPL or national poverty line was estimated at 74% in 1995, and that 2002 estimates were that it had 
risen to 80% (UNDP etc. 2003, 2).11 Over 1990-2005, the UN bodies estimate that an average 83% of Zim-
babweans lived below the USD 2 per day poverty line, a share with which Zimbabwe was only surpassed by 
nine countries in the world (UNDP 2007-2008).
Despite the deteriorating situation in the cities, poverty has concentrated in rural areas, in particular in 
Matabeleland North and in the south-eastern provinces of Manicaland and Masvingo – largely part of the 
semi-arid regions. By the early 2000s, with the huge rise in unemployment and consequent male migration 
away from rural areas, rural households headed by women became increasingly common; these households 
are nearly always the most disadvantaged. The feminisation of rural areas implied the feminisation of 
poverty (UNDP etc. 2003). In 2003, 69% of (de facto) female-headed households lived below the TCPL, 
compared with 60% of male-headed households (ZNVAC 2003; GOZ 2009). The transition to smallholder 
production has been slow and painful, and plagued by droughts. Agricultural production in general has 
suffered as a result of weak support services, lack of credit, and acute shortages of essential inputs such 
as seeds, fertilizer and fuel (website Rural Poverty Portal; source: IFAD). Both the land seizures and Op-
eration Murambatsvina have deeply frustrated this transition process. Donor organisations estimated that 
for Spring 2009 almost nine million Zimbabweans were in need of food aid. The harvest in 2009 greatly 
improved, but it was in August estimated that 2.8 million people needed food assistance till the 2010 harvest 
(ICRC (International Red Cross), cited in ILO 2009; UN OCHA 2010). Moreover, food relief programmes, 
in particular aiming at the distribution of subsidised maize in rural areas, have been politicised, with local 
ofﬁ  cials of the ruling party discriminating against human rights defenders, opposition members, and CSO 
members. Such political manipulation of food aid was noted in both 2004 and 2007, and was for instance 
directed against members of Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) (Amnesty International 2004, 2007). 
Also if these despicable practises will belong to the past, combined with the effects of climate change food 
security may well remain a serious problem in Zimbabwe for quite some time to come (UNDP 2006).
11  A more recent government publication mentions somewhat lower share below the TCPL for 2003: in urban areas 71% and in 
urban areas 61% (GOZ 2009, 9).Page ● 45
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After 2003 reliable poverty data based on extensive ﬁ  eld research is lacking. Though the results need 
to be treated with caution, smaller surveys that were undertaken more recently indicated that 85-90% of 
households were living in poverty. They also conﬁ  rm the shrinking, if not collapse, of the formal sector 
and the related collapse of middle-class urban incomes (for instance, the 2005 survey reported in Bracking 
and Sachikonye 2006). The CIA World Factbook currently notes 68% of the population below the national 
poverty line, but that ﬁ  gure is obviously a low estimate. Other more credible estimates are that in 2009 more 
than 85% of the population continued to live below the national poverty line, meaning that 10 million or 
more Zimbabweans live in desperate poverty (a.o. US Dept of State 2010). As mentioned, the ofﬁ  cial Pov-
erty Datum Line for January 2009 was set at USD 552. According to the national statistical ofﬁ  ce USD 117 
was needed for food, and the average family would need to spend USD 375 on basics such as accommoda-
tion, transport to get to and from work, school fees and clothes. There was no provision for luxuries (The 
Herald, on website allAfrica news). As we will see (section 2.8.1) it is likely that currently also most young 
females in commercial services earn less than the poverty line amount. 
In the course of the 2000s, large parts of the population had to take refuge to remittances from mi-
grants in order to diversify their livelihood survival strategies (Tevera and Zinyama 2002), and the impor-
tance of remittances was no longer limited to de facto female households.12 Already in 2003 over a quarter 
(28.5%) of Zimbabwean households had remittances as one of their income strands (C-Safe 2003 survey, 
cited in Bloch 2006). A 2005 survey established that half of households in the two largest cities, Harare and 
Bulawayo, were dependent on migrant remittances for everyday consumption (Bracking and Sachikonye 
2006). The share of ofﬁ  cially recorded remittances on Zimbabwe’s GDP grew from 2.4% to 7.2%, about 
equaling the contribution of tourism to GDP. Moreover, if the unrecorded informal remittances, estimated 
at 150% of ofﬁ  cial remittances, are also taken into account, the total magnitude of these money ﬂ  ows raises 
to over 17% of the country’s GDP, larger than the contribution of agriculture to that GDP (Republic of 
Zimbabwe 2010). Various surveys found in the mid-2000s that about three in four migrants sent back remit-
tances in money or kind, and that also three-quarters of migrant-sending households received remittances. 
Supporting family members was univocally the main reason for sending remittances. Besides money, most 
migrants sending remittances –60-70% in the various surveys-- also sent non-monetary gifts, most often 
clothing, followed by foodstuffs (Tevera and Chikanda 2005; Bloch 2006).
12  Already in 1993-94 and 1996-97, the total income of de facto female rural households in a household panel depended for 
44-45% on remittances. For all rural panel households, these shares were 14% and 19% respectively. Notably in 1996-97, 
remittances widened income inequality, with the top 20% of rural households receiving nearly 27% of their income from 
remittances and the lowest 20% less than 10% (Cavendish 2000).Page ● 46
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In the mid-1990s inequality was high in Zimbabwe and it persisted at that level. In 1995-96, the richest 
20% of the population spent 56% of total consumption, whereas only 4.6% was left for the poorest 20% 
(UNDP 2007-2008). According to UN sources, the Gini coefﬁ  cient (a measure that rates 0 as perfect equal-
ity and 1.00 as perfect inequality) from 1990 to 2005 ﬂ  uctuated between 0.50 and 0.56, as to end up for 
2007 at 50.1 (UNDP 2009). These coefﬁ  cients were already comparatively high, but they were surpassed by 
the observed “Gini” of 0.61 for 2003 mentioned in a recent government report, that correctly concluded: 
“Zimbabwe has one of the highest inequalities in Southern Africa and also in the world” (GOZ 2009, 10). 
According to this report, the top 20% in 2003 accounted for 65% of total consimption, an increase of their 
share of 9%points in seven years. Clearly, the Mugabe regime has failed to change the wealth and income 
distribution and improve the buying power and living conditions of the black masses (cf. Bond 2007, 161) 
– or, as the government report bluntly concluded, “the minority became richer while the majority poorer” 
(GOZ 2009, 10).
2.6.  Demographics and female labour force
2.6.1.  Population and fertility
Estimates of Zimbabwe’s total population vary widely. Most likely the current population size is less 
than 12 million. The latest CIA World Factbook estimate comes at 11.6 million for July 2010, of which 6.1 
million (52.5%) women and 5.5 million men. The estimated 2010 median age is extremely low: 17.8 years 
– 16.7 years for males and 18.9 years for females. Also, the very high share of 43.1% of the population is 
0-14 years, while 53.0% is in the working age group of 15-64-years-olds; only 3.9% is 65 of age and older. 
Nearly 55% of the working age population is female. These numbers cannot be anything else than rough 
estimates: though they do take into account the effects of excess mortality due to AIDS, it is hardly possible 
to estimate the effects of migration. We mentioned already that according to an ofﬁ  cial estimate about four 
million Zimbabweans, over a quarter of the population, had ﬂ  ed abroad. The World Bank (2009c) estimated 
that the population from 2002-2008 fell by an average 0.1% yearly, and the labour force by 0.2%. In 2009 
and early 2010, the population decrease seems to have speeded up: for 2008, most estimates still ended up 
with approximately 12.5 million inhabitants (cf website UNICEF; World Bank 2009a, 2009b). Population 
estimates are complicated further because of the fact that there are 880,000 to 960,000 internally displaced 
people in the country (estimate for 2008: UNDP 2009). In view of all uncertainties, it does not make sense Page ● 47
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to calculate detailed population growth ﬁ  gures over the last decade as well as for the years to come. The 
CIA World Factbook, for example, expects a population growth rate for 2010 of nearly 3% (even exactly 
2.954%), but this expectation assumes very positive economic and political developments, leading to the 
return from exile of a substantial number of Zimbabweans. As far as there is any population growth, it takes 
place in urban areas. Between 2000 and 2008, the urban population increased on average by 1.2% yearly 
(website UNICEF).
Minority ethnic groups include white Zimbabweans, mostly of British origin, but some of Afrikaner, 
Greek, Portuguese and Dutch origin as well, who currently make up less than one percent of the total. 
The white population dropped from a peak of around 296,000 in 1975 to possibly 120,000 in 1999 and 
was estimated to be no more than 50,000 in 2002, and likely less. Mixed-race citizens form 0.5% of the 
population and various Asian ethnic groups, mostly of Indian and Chinese origin, are also 0.5% (wikipedia 
Zimbabwe).
With an estimated birth rate of 31.6 per 1,000 of the population in 2010, Zimbabwe’s birth rate is still 
rather high, though lower than in the other sub-Saharan countries except South Africa and Botswana. The 
same holds for the estimated total fertility rate (TFR, the number of births a woman would have if she 
survived to age 50). In 1975, the TFR was with 7.7 even higher than the high sub-Saharan average, but if 
fell rapidly to 3.6 in 2004 (UNDP 2006, 2007-2008). Most recently, the TFR estimated for 2008, 2009 and 
2010 of 3.7 children per women is slightly higher, and in worldwide perspective also rather high, but mod-
est compared to the same rates of most sub-Saharan countries (again, with the exception of South Africa 
and Botswana). With an estimated 14.9 deaths per 1.000 of the population for 2010, the death rate remains 
rather high but is considerably lower than in ﬁ  ve of six other sub-Saharan countries we studied, the excep-
tion being Botswana (CIA World Factbook, other DECISIONS FOR LIFE country reports). With 59 in 
2007 and 62 in 2008, the infant mortality rate (IMR, the probability of dying between birth and the age of 
1 year per 1,000 live births) had decreased compared to the 77 per 1,000 found for 2000, but it should be 
taken into consideration that already in 1990 the level was 62 per 1,000; nevertheless, the IMR is lower than 
in other sub-Saharan countries except South Africa (WHO 2009; website UNICEF). The under 5 mortality 
rate (U5MR, under 5 of age births per 1,000) showed the same trend, upward from 95 in 1990 to 122 in 
2000, and then ﬂ  uctuating, with as most recent outcomes 90 in 2007 and 96 in 2008 – for sub-Sahara Africa 
rather low ﬁ  gures (WHO 2009; website UNICEF).13 As a consequence of these developments, child mortal-
13  Education and income remain major factors here. The U5MR experienced by children of mothers with no education was 
continuously over ﬁ  vefold that of mothers with higher than secondary education (UNDP etc. 2003). Page ● 48
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ity (the probability of dying between 1st and 5th birthdays) in 2007 remained at 41 per 1,000 live births, lower 
than the 2000 ﬁ  gure of 45 but still higher than the 1990 level of 33 per 1,000. Moreover, it stands to be seen 
whether these ﬁ  gures may not be negatively affected by the country’s collapsing health system (see our next 
section). Birth rates remain considerably higher in rural areas: though in 2008 37% of the population lived in 
urban areas, only 29% of all births took place in cities and towns (website UNICEF; WHO 2010). 
The lowering of the life expectancy at birth is maybe the most signiﬁ  cant sign of Zimbabwe’s rapidly 
deteriorating health situation. The country by 2007 had one of world’s lowest life expectancies: an average 45 
years, of which 45 for men and 44 for women, implying a dramatic fall from the average of 60 years in 1990, 
with the largest decrease of 19 years for women (on average 63 years in 1990, against 57 for men). Jointly with 
that of Lesotho, the overall life expectancy is currently the second lowest in the world, only surpassed by Af-
ghanistan (with an average 42 years -- WHO 2009). The most recent life expectancy at birth rate, for 2008, is 
with an average 44 years again lower (website UNICEF).14 In the early 2000s, it was estimated that two in three 
of those born in those years would not reach the age of 40.15 One can imagine the gloomy societal effects of 
such a perspective.
For an indication of the situation of our target group, the adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women 
15-19 of age) is of special importance. For 2003 UN statistics set this rate at 101, in international perspective 
a rather high ﬁ  gure though below the African regional average of 117 (UNDP 2008; WHO 2009). The tradi-
tional practice of offering a young girl in marriage as compensatory payment in interfamily disputes still con-
tinues, as did arranged marriage of young girls. The legal age for a civil marriage is 16 years for girls and 18 for 
boys. Customary marriage, recognized under the Customary Marriages Act, does not provide for a minimum 
marriage age for either boys or girls; however, the criminal code prohibits sexual relations with anyone younger 
than 16 years of age. NGOs reported that they occasionally saw evidence of underage marriages, particularly 
in isolated religious communities or among HIV/AIDS orphans who did not have relatives willing or able to 
take care of them (US Dept of State 2010). According to preliminary outcomes of the MIMS 2009 survey, 
32% of women aged 20-49 years currently in marriage were married before 18 years of age, but the rate was 
highest (40%) in ages 45-49, suggesting that new generations are less inclined to marry early. However, the 
same survey also found that about one-third of the girls not attending primary (!) school did so because of 
early marriage or pregnancy (website UNDP/MDG goals/Zimbabwe).
14  As a matter of fact, life expectancy was recovering compared to estimates from the early 2000s, most likely caused by the re-
cently observed downward trend in the HIV prevalence rate (see next section). In UNDP etc. (2003) for 2001 life expectancy 
at birth was set at 38.2 years, while in UNDP (2006) even 36.6 years was calculated for 2004. 
15  For 2000-05, UNDP (2007-2008) estimated the probability at birth not surviving to age 40 at 66%. Page ● 49
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2.6.2. Health
Besides from political-related violence, the demography, economy and social life of Zimbabwe are 
deeply inﬂ  uenced by the widespread incidence of the HIV and AIDS pandemic. By 2007 there were an es-
timated 14,600 per 100,000 adults living with HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe, the sixth highest proportion in the 
world and only slightly below the percentages of South Africa and Zambia. This implied the existence of 
1.2 to 1.4 million people living with HIV/AIDS in the country, among whom about 680,000 women aged 
15 years and older (WHO 2009; CIA World Factbook; website UNICEF). By 2007, it was estimated that 
about 140,000 Zimbabweans had died from HIV/AIDS (UNDP 2008). Disquieting are the high prevalence 
rates among women; there is a feminisation of HIV prevalence and care. The most recently published HIV 
prevalence rates for adults aged 15-49 years, those for 2005-2006, concluded to an overall rate of 18.1%. 
Yet, a considerable higher proportion of adult women living with HIV/AIDS (21.1%) was found than for 
men (14.5%), and women constitute 54% of adults living with the disease (UN MDG Indicators; UNAIDS 
/ WHO 2009; GOZ 2009). The 2005-06 population survey found 11% of young women (15-24 years) 
infected with HIV, against 4% of young men.16 For both men and women, the risk of acquiring HIV in-
creases considerably from their late teens to mid thirties. A total of 6% of young women and 3% of young 
men aged 15-19 years tested HIV-positive, compared with about 35% of women and 30-32% of men in 
their 30s (UNAIDS / WHO 2008). All available evidence makes clear that in Zimbabwe prevalence rates 
are higher in girls and women. The 2003 UN/government/CSO publication puts these outcomes in the 
perspective of persistent gender inequality and inequity in development, and observes: “The girl child in 
particular, due to cultural and traditional beliefs, has been a victim of sexual violence on the one hand and 
economic vulnerability on the other, at a time when the HIV and AIDS epidemic is raging” (UNDP etc. 
2003, 3) – a conclusion that also remains unabatedly relevant. Also, Zimbabwe’s women dominate the care 
economy, with over three in four (77%) caregivers in households with chronically ill persons being females 
in 2003 (GOZ 2009). 
Nevertheless, a downward trend in the HIV prevalence rate in Zimbabwe has been observed since 2000, 
the ﬁ  rst such decline in Southern Africa. From an adult prevalence rate of 33.7% in 2001, the rate decreased 
to, as mentioned, 18% in 2005-06, and further down to a (preliminary) rate of 15.3% in 2008 (UNAIDS / 
WHO 2008; World Bank 2009c; GOZ 2009). The downward trend reﬂ  ects a combination of high mortality 
and declining HIV incidence, related, in part, to changes in sexual behaviour. For instance, there is evidence 
16  The UNICEF website gives considerably lower rates for 2007 i.e. 7.7% for young women aged 15-24 and 2.9% for young men 
of the same age.Page ● 50
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from eastern Zimbabwe that more women and men have been avoiding sex with a non-regular partner, 
and that consistent condom use with non-regular partners increased for women – though not for men. On 
the other hand, a comparison of data in 1999 and 2005 showed only minor changes in condom use dur-
ing sex with a non-regular partner. In 1999, 42% of women said they used condoms the last time they had 
sex with a non-regular partner (“last high-risk sex” in WHO and UN terms), compared with 47% in 2005; 
whereas for adult men, condom use during sex with a non-regular partner with 69% respectively 71% re-
mained about the same (UNAIDS / WHO 2008; UNDP 2007-2008).17 In the general population, modern 
contraceptive use has increased considerably between 1999 and 2005-06. Whereas the incidence of such use 
among married women 15-19 of age in 1999 was 10%, in 2005-06 it had more than tripled to over 35%; 
in the 20-24 age category, it increased from 40% to 60%, and in the category married women aged 25-29 it 
rose from 52% to 69% (WHO 2010). 
In rural Zimbabwe, women who tested HIV-positive recently reported increased consistent condom use 
with their primary partners, although individuals testing negative reported an overall increase in risky sexual 
behaviour. This result underscores the need for intensiﬁ  ed prevention services to accompany initiatives to 
promote knowledge of a HIV status (UNAIDS / WHO 2009). Clearly, with the rather low levels of public 
awareness of HIV/AIDS the behavourial risks remain considerable. With 46% in 2006, the proportion of 
15-24-year-old Zimbabwean females that had comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS was mod-
erate; their male peers scored with 44% even a fraction lower (UNDP 2008). 
Orphanage is one of the most ugly effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It is a huge problem in Zim-
babwe. With in 2007 about 1.3 million orphans --one-quarter of the country’s children-- of which over 
three quarters or 1.0 million orphaned by AIDS, the country had one of the world’s highest percentages of 
orphaned children. Though their increase is ﬂ  attening, their numbers increased further in 2008 and 2009. 
An estimated 100,000 children lived in child-headed households (GOZ 2009; website UNICEF).18 As we 
argued in our DECISIONS FOR LIFE Country Report No. 1 on Mozambique, orphanage will deﬁ  nitely 
ruin the prospects in life of many girls. In Zimbabwe the large majority of 90% percent of orphans are 
cared for by the extended family. Many grandparents are left to care for the young, who in most instances 
have no income of their own and have severe limitations on the number of orphans they can look after. 
17  UN MDG Indicators mentions here slightly different data: both in 1999 and in 2006 42% condom use at last high-risk sex for 
women, against 69% respectively 68% for men.
18  In 2007 the Ministry of Public Service, Labour, and Social Welfare and UNICEF formalized agreements with 21 NGOs 
to advance the National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children designed to ensure that orphans and vulnerable 
children will be able to access education, food, health services, and birth registration, and will be protected from abuse and 
exploitation. UNICEF reported in 2008 that the NGOs involved had reached more than 200,000 orphans and vulnerable 
children with comprehensive support and protection since the beginning of the program (US Dept of State 2010).Page ● 51
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In many cases children or adolescents head families and are forced to work to survive. Orphaned children 
are more likely to be abused, not to be enrolled in or withdrawn from school, and to suffer discrimination 
and stigmatisation. Under pressure of the HIV/AIDS pandemic the social fabric of the extended family 
shows signs of erosion. Extended families and communities often refuse to take in orphans out of fear that 
they or their own children may contract HIV. Some children are forced to turn to prostitution for income 
(UNDP etc. 2003; US Dept of State 2010). Children are also often heavily burdened with the role of car-
egivers in AIDS-stricken families, extending tasks far beyond a child’s “normal” tasks and responsibilities. 
They experience high personal costs like loss of friends and isolation as well as a major emotional burden 
(Robson et al 2006). 
Against the background of economic deterioration in Zimbabwe the impact of AIDS-related illness 
and death is often acutely threatening household viability. Women take up the responsibility of caring for 
the sick, negating the time investment into agricultural activities, often their sole source of livelihood. In 
cases where the husband dies, the widow has to work for longer hours during the day to make up for the loss 
of income, often leaving children unattended (UNDP etc. 2003). According to a study undertaken in 2005 
in the east of the country, in households with AIDS-related deaths the median expenditure on health care, 
funeral and memorial services equalled a quarter of the average annual household income or the related 
time, leading to reduced labour input and rapid impoverishment. By the mid-1990s tombstones had become 
unaffordable. And even before the turn of the century smallholder agriculture was heavily hit. Yet, also large 
companies enter into difﬁ  culties due to the epidemic. Already in 1990, the National Railways of Zimbabwe 
reported operational problems in this respect. Education, health care and water engineering are other vital 
services suffering from labour shortages and high replacement and training costs linked up with HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS / WHO 2008; Bollinger et al 1999). 
The government has a national HIV/AIDS policy in place that prohibits discrimination against persons 
with HIV/AIDS, and the law aims to protect against discrimination of workers in the private sector and 
parastatals. Despite these provisions, societal discrimination against persons affected by HIV/AIDS remains 
a problem. Over 2009 it has been reported that ostracism and condemnation of those affected by HIV/
AIDS continued. The state of collapse of the health system (see below) also works out in the direction of 
societal discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS. For example, maternity wards no longer had sepa-
rate facilities for HIV-infected mothers (US Dept of State 2010). Moreover, the effectiveness of national 
HIV/AIDS policy is seriously hampered, and clinical testing and therapy in Zimbabwe are in dire straits. In Page ● 52
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2007 the coverage of Anti Retro-Viral Therapy (ART) among people with advanced HIV infection stood at 
16%, except for Angola the lowest rate in sub-Saharan Africa. Also, the tuberculosis (TB) treatment success 
rate under the directly observed treatment, short course (DOTS) strategy was with 60% the lowest in sub-
Saharan Africa (WHO 2009; GOZ 2009). Research shows the baleful combination between HIV/AIDS and 
TB, as one of the main opportunist infections – but largely curable. And though in Zimbabwe with some 
reported 10,500 cases (WHO 2009), the TB prevalence rate was a moderate 85 per 100,000 inhabitants in 
2007, under conditions of worsening health care this may change rapidly for worse. Strengthening the civic 
society may well contribute to the decrease of HIV/AIDS. For instance, in rural Zimbabwe young women 
with secondary education, participating in well functioning community groups were more likely to avoid 
HIV than others. Youth groups appeared most beneﬁ  cial: membership of a well-run group was associated 
with an increased chance of avoiding HIV (Gregson et al 2004).
At independence, the policies of racial inequality were reﬂ  ected in the disease patterns of the black 
majority. The ﬁ  rst decade after independence saw rapid gains in areas such as immunization coverage, ac-
cess to health care and contraceptive prevalence rate. Zimbabwe was thus considered internationally to have 
achieved a good record of health development. However, these gains were eroded by structural adjustment 
in the 1990s and the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. As the GNU recognized in 2009, the EASP-
related policy of cost recovery in health “largely compromised the health of the poor in general and women 
in particular. Research evidence showed that the general attendance at clinics dropped as most people failed 
to pay the required health fees. Thus cost recovery in health which was meant to improve efﬁ  ciency in 
running the health delivery system in reality shifted the health care burden from the state to women who 
became unpaid home nurses” (GOZ 2009). The health infrastructure continued to deteriorate. Already 
in 2002, nearly four in ﬁ  ve health professionals indicated that they lacked basic equipment at their health 
institutions, such as injections and thermometers (Chikanda 2005, 169). In recent years the health system 
has more or less collapsed. By the end of November 2008, three of Zimbabwe’s four major hospitals had 
shut down, along with the Zimbabwe Medical School and the fourth major hospital had two wards and no 
operating theatres working. Those hospitals still open were not able to obtain basic drugs and medicines 
(wikipedia Zimbabwe).
The ongoing political and economic crisis has contributed to a move of health workers to other sectors 
–notably to the private health sector-- and in particular to the emigration of doctors and other skilled health 
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doctors (Republic of Zimbabwe 2010). In 2000, over half (51%) of all physicians born in Zimbabwe ap-
peared in nine major receiving countries (including South Africa, where most of them have migrated to), as 
did nearly one in four (24%) of Zimbabwe-born professional nurses, mostly in the UK (Clemens and Pat-
terson 2008). Averaged for 2000-2004, the country had only 16 physicians per 100,000 people, compared to 
77 in South Africa (UNDP 2007-2008). The emigration ﬂ  ows intensiﬁ  ed after the turn of the century (Con-
nell et al 2007). In 2002 over two in three (68%) Zimbabwean respondents in a large survey among health 
professionals declared an intention to emigrate, the highest share of six African countries. Financial motives 
were mostly mentioned, but ﬁ  nding better living conditions, lack of resources and facilities within the coun-
try’s health care system, and “see no future in the country” ranked high among the motives too, also higher 
than in the other countries surveyed. Those who stayed reported increasing workloads and longer working 
hours, as well as medical attention coming too late. Moreover, the large-scale ﬂ  ight from professionals out 
of the public health systems has made it necessary for less or non-qualiﬁ  ed people, such as nurses aides, to 
perform tasks that are normally beyond their ability, with the risk of misdiagnosis or inadequate response 
(Awases et al 2004; Chikanda 2005; Connell et al 2007).
Inadequate medical facilities in the ﬁ  ght against HIV and AIDS, including a lack of electricity and 
medication, have contributed in particular to the rise of maternal mortality to the relatively high rate of 880 
deaths per 100,000 live births (modelled estimate by WHO 2009; US Dept of State 2010), against 283 deaths 
per 100,000 during 1984-1994 (UNDP etc. 2003).19 At the same time inequalities in health and health care 
have been growing. The proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel fell from 72.5% in 1999 
to 69% in 2005-06 (UNDP 2008); by then, women from the poorest 20% of households had 46% access 
to skilled health staff, less than half of the 95% access of women from the richest 20%; in 1999 these last 
ﬁ  gures were 57% and 94% respectively (WHO 2010; UNDP 2007-2008). There are indications that most 
recently only about half of all births are attended by skilled staff. The sad reality is that in rural areas many 
women continue to arrive at health facilities too late to save their babies and themselves. In order to avoid 
such situations, in 2010 a Maternity Waiting Homes programme has been started up around the country, 
supported by various international donors (Shoko 2010). 
In August 2008 large areas of Zimbabwe were struck by the cholera epidemic. By December 2008 more 
than 10,000 people had been infected in all but one of Zimbabwe’s provinces and the outbreak had spread 
to Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia. On December 4, 2008 the Zimbabwe government 
19  Recently the Zimbabwe Maternal and Perinatal Mortality Study estimated the maternal mortality ratio lower i.e. at 725 deaths 
per 100,000 live births (Shoko 2010).Page ● 54
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declared the outbreak to be a national emergency, and asked for international aid. In 2009 an association of 
doctors in Zimbabwe has made calls for Mugabe to make moves to assist the ailing health service (wikipedia 
Zimbabwe). By contrast, government ofﬁ  cials have called for more evidence and result-based program-
ming, in particular in tackling the HIV/AIDS pandemic. For example, in May 2010 Health and Child Wel-
fare minister, Henry Madzorera, argued that HIV and AIDS research priorities “has been an agenda of the 
donor obviously ignorant or simply dismissive of what the local challenges are” (Chikololere 2010).
The available statistics suggest that, despite the deteriorating health conditions, until 2006 access to es-
sential infrastructural provisions was rather stable. In 2006 according to WHO data 46% of Zimbabwe’s 
population had access to improved sanitation facilities, whereas in 1990 this proportion was 44%. In urban 
areas such access slightly decreased, from 65% in 1990 to 63% in 2006, but in rural areas it improved at the 
same time, from 35% to 37%, though remaining at a much lower level. By then, the national sanitation level 
was the lowest of sub-Saharan countries except for Mozambique. The proportion of the population with 
access to a safe (in UN terms improved) water source grew slightly, from 78% in 1990 to 81% in 2006. This 
was again due to larger access in rural areas, from 70% in 1990 to 72% in 2006, while in urban areas access 
fell slightly, from 99% in 1990 to 98% in 2006 (WHO 2009).
In May 2010, the UN Ofﬁ  ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that 
Zimbabwe remains vulnerable to epidemics largely because of the deteriorated health infrastructure. The 
general humanitarian situation is further exacerbated by a weakened infrastructure, undermining the coun-
try’s capacity to respond to emergencies. Currently, the country is battling cholera, measles and typhoid 
outbreaks. By 2 May 2010, the number of cumulative cholera cases stood at nearly 98,000, while since Au-
gust 2008 over 4,200 deaths have been reported. OCHA clariﬁ  es that the international donor community 
contributes substantially to ﬁ  ght further deterioration of conditions in the area of water, sanitation and hy-
giene. The country’s rates of acute malnutrition remain stable, but there are indications that rates of chronic 
malnutrition continue to rise (UN OCHA 2010).Page ● 55
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2.6.3.  Women’s labour market share
Rather outdated ﬁ  gures, as of 1999, deliver female shares in total employment for eight industries: see 
Table 3. These statistics are less detailed than those of other countries, dividing across 15 or 16 industries. 
The table indicates that at the time women made up majorities in government (64%), followed by services 
(62%) and agriculture (58%), while their shares were quite small in transport (2%) and in mining and 
construction (7%). The female share in manufacturing (38%) was rather at par with that in many other 
countries; by contrast, that in education (24%) was very low by international standards. Yet, the education 
percentage may have been subject to statistical errors; the gender gap report 2009 of the World Economic 
Forum states (without year) that women in Zimbabwe formed more than half (51%) of primary education 
teachers and two in ﬁ  ve (40%) of secondary education teachers (Hausmann et al 2009).
Table 3. Female employment shares by industry, total, Zimbabwe, 1999
female
x 1,000 %
agriculture, forestry, ﬁ  shing 1,564 57.7








Source: authors’ calculations based on ILO Laborsta
As for the female shares in paid employment, more detailed ﬁ  gures can be calculated but again rather 
outdated, that is for 1999 and 2002: see Table 4 (next page). Page ● 56
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Table 4. Female employment shares by industry, paid employees, Zimbabwe, 1999 and 2002
1999 2002
x 1,000 % x 1,000 %
agriculture, forestry, ﬁ  shing 108 32.1 70 31.7
mining, construction 3 4.2 2 4.2
manufacturing 17 8.6 18 10.5
of  which
textiles, apparel, leather 7 14.9 6 15.9
other 10 6.5 12 9.2
utilities 1 4.7 1 7.0
construction 3 4.9 3 5.9
wholesale and retail, hotels and restaurants 21 18.5 21 19.6
transport 4 9.6 4 9.6
ﬁ  nance, insurance, real estate and business 
services 8 24.6 8 29.1
community, social, personal services 128 29.0 130 31.9
of  which 
central government 77 32.5 - -
regional government 8 22.4 - -
publicly-owned enterprises 6 12.4 - -
other 37 31.1 - -
Total 293 22.3 256 23.9
Source: authors’ calculations based on ILO Laborsta
As indicated earlier, women are overrepresented in informal employment, and consequently women ’s 
share in paid employment in 1999 was only 22.3%, though increasing somewhat to 23.9% in 2002. In all 
industries women formed (small) minorities of paid employees, only nearing one in three in three industries 
-- agriculture, forestry and ﬁ  shing; ﬁ  nance et cetera, and community, social and personal services. At the 
turn of the century community, social and personal services showed up as the main stronghold of paid 
female labour, with in 2002 even over half of all paid employed. Remarkable is the low share of females in 
paid employment in manufacturing, even in elsewhere female-dominated industries like textiles, apparel and 
leather. Comparison with Table 3 clariﬁ  es that in various industries the paid employee status in 1999 was 
only attributed to small minorities of all female workers: less than 5% in agriculture and less than 20% in 
manufacturing. It is striking that even in government only 70% was in paid employment (all data: authors’ 
calculations based on ILO Laborsta).
As for occupational groups, the World Economic Forum report mentioned earlier indicated for Zimba-
bwe a 18% female share in the occupational group at the highest level, legislators, senior ofﬁ  cials and man-
agers. This suggests a worsened position of women at this level, as for 2001 the national statistical bureau 
reported a female share of 27%, or 9%points more. By contrast for the second highest category, profession-
als and technicians, the most recently reported female share was 40%, compared with a 2001 ﬁ  gure of 35% 
-- 5%points less (UNDP etc. 2003; Hausmann et al 2009). For 1999 national statistics found 19% females Page ● 57
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among directors, managers and company secretaries; less than 1% females among “business and ﬁ  nance 
engineers and technicians”; 26% among “administrative associate professionals”, and 38% females among 
clerks and secretaries (authors’ calculations based on ILO Laborsta).20 The proportion of female clerks and 
secretaries ﬁ  tted in the sub-Saharan context where men remain strongly represented in these occupations, 
but was rather low in wider international perspective.
2.7.  Education and skill levels of the female labour force
2.7.1. Literacy
Zimbabwe in the 1990s reached a high literacy level, which could be maintained until some years ago. 
The country’s adult literacy rate –those age 15 and over that can read and write—in 1999-2006 was, ac-
cording to the UNDP Human Development Indicators, 90.7%, divided in 93.7% for men and 87.6% for 
women, resulting in 93% women to men parity (UNDP 2008). For 2008, UNESCO estimates were even 
slightly higher, with 91.4% -- 94.4% for men and 88.8% for women, or 94% women to men parity – respec-
tively 17 and 25%points higher than the sub-Sahara Africa average (UIS 2010). The literacy rate of young 
women have surpassed that of their male peers, and both levels are quite high. For 2007 the overall youth 
(15-24-year-olds) literacy rate was 98.3%, with 98.7% for young women and 97.9% for young men or 101% 
women to men parity – compared with 1992, increases of 2.9%points overall, 1.4%points for young men 
and 4.3% points for young women (MDG Indicator 2.3, derived from UN MDG Indicators and based on 
UNESCO data).
2.7.2.  Education of girls
In the ﬁ  rst years after independence, the government expanded primary and secondary education mas-
sively, declaring education to be a basic human right. Zimbabwe’s education system basically consists of 
seven years of primary and six years of secondary schooling. Secondary education is sub-divided into three 
sequential and hierarchical levels: (a) the Zimbabwe Junior Certiﬁ  cate for 13-14-year-olds (if completed, 
ISCED level 2); (b) the General Certiﬁ  cate of Education for students in 15-16 year range, with the Cam-
bridge terminal ‘O’ level exams (ISCED level 3) ; (c) the Higher School Certiﬁ  cate (Advanced or ‘A’ level), 
preparing students to enter universities or polytechnics in the country or abroad (ISCED level 3) (websites 
UNICEF, SACMEQ). Enrollment in education has been growingly segmented. Initially, school education 
20  Also for 1999 information on female shares in other occupational groups, like service and sales workers and elementary oc-
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was made free in 1980, but since 1988 the government has steadily increased the charges attached to school 
enrollment. As a result, those who could afford sent their children to independent schools as opposed to the 
government-run schools (with lower fees) which were mainly attended by children from the poorer parts of 
the population (wikipedia Education in Zimbabwe). 
Until the early 2000s the country was able to maintained rather high enrollment rates, for primary and 
secondary education about 10%points above the sub-Saharan average (UIS 2010). Yet, the joint 2003 report 
cited earlier pointed at the heavy constraints putting pressure on the educational system, by noting “strong 
indications of stress in the education sector as a result of HIV and AIDS mortality and morbidity of both 
staff, pupils and parents as well as due to brain drain” (UNDP 2003, 2). We already pointed at a third major 
factor: the excessive violence of ZANU-PF gangs against teachers in the course of the 2000s. Inﬂ  uenced 
by these three factors, the country’s relative position in education quickly deteriorated. By 2004, UNICEF 
estimated its combined gross enrollment rate at 52%, only slightly above the sub-Saharan average (UNDP 
2007-2008). The inclusive government acknowledges that from 2002-2006 enrollments in primary education 
decreased by 1.4% (GOZ 2009, 19). Though, again, adequate recent statistics are lacking, various reports of 
international donors clarify that 2007 and 2008 have witnessed low enrollment rates, in particular of girls. 
Main causes were displacement of thousands of children from their homes, emigration of qualiﬁ  ed teach-
ers, and sheer poverty and hunger, with the inability to pay school fees. In most regions of the country, fewer 
girls than boys attended secondary school. If a family was unable to pay tuition costs, it was most often girls 
who left school or never began. The Child Protection Society reported that girls were more likely to drop 
out because they were more readily employable, especially as domestic workers. In 2006, in collaboration 
with UNICEF and other partners, the government launched a National Girls’ Education Strategic Plan to 
increase the likelihood of achieving (the MDG goal of) universal primary education and ensuring that girls 
stayed in school. The effects of the Plan are still unclear (US Dept of State 2009, 2010; website UNICEF). 
The Department of Education has admitted that 20,000 teachers have left Zimbabwe since 2007 and 
that half of the current cohort of the country’s children have not progressed beyond primary school (wiki-
pedia Zimbabwe). Current vacancy rates are extremely high across all levels in education (Republic of 
Zimbabwe 2010). Quality losses were huge. For instance, in 2006 the proportion of grade 7 pupils whose 
academic performance in the four examinable subjects obtaining grade 5 or better was very low at 33%, a 
major decline compared with 48% in 2000 (GOZ 2009). In the course of 2009 access to public education 
started to improve. In May 2009 the government increased salaries to about USD 150. As of August 2009, it Page ● 59
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began paying all civil servants, including teachers, a monthly allowance of USD 115-200, as an incentive for 
the 20,000 teachers who had left the profession to return to the classroom. Yet, teachers indicated the ILO 
Commission of Inquiry that on such allowances they were unable to send their own children to school (ILO 
2009, 113). During 2009 the teachers’ unions continued to pressure the government to further improve 
wages. In response to pressure from teachers and the public, the government also reduced school fees from 
between USD 50 and USD 150 to between USD 10 and USD 20 per trimester, as well as exempted teach-
ers’ children from paying school fees in public schools (US Dept of State 2009, 2010; ILO 2009). The new 
Minister of Education informed the ILO Commission that he was implementing a new human rights and 
civic education curriculum, teaching democracy, tolerance and non-violence (ILO 2009). In 2009, schools 
and clinics reopened in most communities, although many families continued to struggle to pay fees and 
purchase educational materials for their children (US Dept of State 2010; various news items on website 
allAfrica news). It is to be hoped that, under improving conditions, in the near future participation in educa-
tion can at least be restored at 2002 levels.21
The recovery of tertiary education is quite important for the perspectives of the target group of our 
project. Currently, ofﬁ  cial lists suggest that Zimbabwe has 12 universities, but only six have functioning 
websites (efforts to access via ZARNET website) The oldest university is the (State) University of Zimba-
bwe (UZ). The UZ website actually notes 11,200 undergraduates and 500 postgraduates, slightly above the 
numbers of 2001. UZ has declined in international university rankings recently. By 2007, the shortage of 
staff prevented teaching and examination of some programmes. By 2009, the vacancy rate had increased to 
67%. Problems with water and electricity supply and maintenance culminated in the UZ’s failure to re-open 
for the 2008-2009 academic year. Female enrollment remained to lag behind, in spite of an afﬁ  rmative ac-
tion programme built in the university’s policy in 1995. In 2001 and 2005, cases of serious gender-related 
violence and sexual exploitation at UZ were reported (wikipedia University of Zimbabwe; Republic of 
Zimbabwe 2010). Such and related problems may add to the explanation of the success of the Zimbabwe 
Open University (ZOU), as the only distance learning university in the country. Since its start in 1999 ZOU 
21  In 2002, gross enrollment in primary education was 98%: 99% for boys and 97% for girls; with 84%, girls’ net enrollment was 
slightly higher than boys’ (83%). In that year, the survival rate to grade 5 was 70%; between 1999 and 2002 the intake ratio 
to the last grade of primary education had already been falling, with 8%points for boys and 7%points for girls (UIS 2010). 
Based on rather unreliable national administrative data, UN MDG Indicators mentions for 2006 net primary enrollment rates 
of 88.4% overall, 87.7% for boys and 89.1% for girls. As for secondary education, in 2002 the net enrollment rate was 39%, 
divided in 41% for boys and 37% for girls, or 90% women to men parity (UIS 2010). UNDP (2007-2008) mentions for 2005 
a net secundary enrollment rate of 34%, thus 5%points less than three years earlier. UN MDG Indicators mentions for 2006 
93% women to men parity in secondary education. The net enrollment rate in tertiary education was in 2002 4% overall, 5% 
for young males in the relevant age cohort and 3% for young females (UIS 2010). Here, UN MDG Indicators mentions for 
2003 63% women to men parity.Page ● 60
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averages about 20,000 students, nearly half of all Zimbabwe’s total (website Zimbabwe Open University). 
Female enrollment in tertiary education is still comparatively low. The higher the level in the education sys-
tem, the lower is the representation of women. In 2007 females made up 55% of those enrolled in teacher 
training colleges, while accounting for 35% of those educated in polytechnics and other vocational institu-
tions. In 2007, the female share in university enrollment stood at to 37% (GOZ 2009).
2.7.3.  Female skill levels
In the current conditions producing an estimate of the division of skill levels in Zimbabwe’s female 
workforce is a daunting task; one only has to recall the consequences of emigration. Thus, the following 
cannot be more than a rough indication and should be used with the greatest caution. We estimate for 2009 
that, of 1,550,000 women in the labour force, 60% (about 930,000 persons) may be called unskilled (ISCED 
levels 0-1), 37.5% or about 580,000 skilled (ISCED levels 2-4), and 2.5% or about 40,000 highly skilled (ter-
tiary educated, ISCED levels 5-6). Of those at skilled level, we estimate 11.5% or 180,000 women educated 
at upper secondary level (ISCED levels 3-4).22 This estimate is mainly based of the documented female 
participation in education between 1990 and 2002 and partly 2002-2006 (UIS 2010, UN MDG Indicators), 
with additionally 2000-2007 educational attainment levels in shares of the population aged 25 and above 
(UNDP 2009), and comparisons with female skill levels in the other six sub-Saharan countries involved in 
the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project.
We can now also produce an estimate of the size of the target group of the DECISIONS FOR LIFE 
project for Zimbabwe, the girls and young women aged 15-29, working in urban areas in commercial serv-
ices. We estimate the total amount of women working in the formal sector at about 250,000, of which about 
50% or 125,000 in urban areas; we also estimate that 40% or 50,000 of them are currently employed in 
commercial services. Assuming that two-thirds of them are 15-29 of age brings the size of the target group 
at 35,000. Depending on the economic and social recovery of the country, some 25,000 to 70,000 girls and 
young women may enter into (formal) commercial services employment in the next ﬁ  ve years; if the recov-
ery takes off rather succesfully, growth in the magnitude of 60-70,000 may not be unlikely. If that happens, 
in particular in retail and tourism new vacancies may open up, allowing much more young females opportu-
nities as vividly depicted on the Zimbabwean Wageindicator website (cf. Zhangazha 2010d, 2010k).
22  Note that these levels indicate the educational/skill levels of the workforce, not the skills demanded in the workplace.Page ● 61
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2.8.  Wages and working conditions of the target group
2.8.1. Wages
Zimbabwe’s economic and political turmoil of the 2000s and the related lack of statistical evidence 
hamper insight in current wages. The last available data, as of 1999- 2002, only covers paid employees and 
unfortunately does not give a gender division. These ﬁ  gures suggest a wage structure rather similar to other 
sub-Saharan countries, though the year-to-year data shows rather uneven developments across industries. 
Even if agriculture, forestry and ﬁ  nishing is left out, the wage dispersion is large, and across industries 5.5 
: 1. If we index average hourly wages in 2002 = 100 for paid employees in the lowest-paid non-agricultural 
sector, construction, then average wages in that year in wholesale and retail were 147, in manufacturing 178, 
in mining 185, in community, social and personal services 206, and in transport etc. 213. The industries 
with the highest wage levels were ﬁ  nance etc. (406) and notably utilities (553). As for occupational groups, 
in 2002 the lowest wage rate was for salespersons in retail / room attendants (chambermaids), occupations 
with most likely relatively high shares of women. If putting their wage rate at 100, it turns out that the wage 
rates of skilled manufacturing jobs at least doubled this rate: for instance, 225 for various printing occupa-
tions, and 244 for dairy product processors (authors’ calculations based on ILO Laborsta). As the latter 
occupations are male-dominated, this so-called sectoral sorting will likely be a major explanation for the 
existence of a considerable gender pay gap. The gender gap report of the World Economic Forum refers to 
a survey (not dated) showing that women in Zimbabwe earned an average 72% of male wages, making up a 
gender pay gap of 28%23 (Hausmann et al 2009). 
Interviews with Zimbabwean young females in the eight commercial services occupations selected for 
the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project suggest that they currently mostly take home between USD 150 and 
USD 500 per month. Broader experience and extra qualiﬁ  cations are relatively well (extra) paid, as is work-
ing for large, mostly foreign, organisations (multinationals, NGOs), with wages raising to USD 600-1,500. In 
employment contracts with large organisations, other than with smaller domestic ﬁ  rms, beneﬁ  ts of medical 
aid are regularly included, and sometimes pensions as well (cf. Zhangazha 2010d-k).
23  Following the international standard formula for the gender pay gap: ((wage men – wage women) : wage men) x100.Page ● 62
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2.8.2. Working  conditions
The government designated the Zimbabwe Occupational Safety Council, a quasi-governmental adviso-
ry body made up of six representatives each from the government, employers, and trade unions, to regulate 
working conditions; however, budgetary constraints and stafﬁ  ng shortages, as well as its status as an advi-
sory council, has made the council ineffective. In 2009 the National Social Security Administration (NSSA) 
continued to experience difﬁ  culty monitoring the thousands of work sites across the country; however, it 
continued to close shops and factories not in compliance. The NSSA reported in 2007 that a high turnover 
in staff meant that only 20 of 31 safety and health inspector positions were ﬁ  lled to monitor an estimated 
14,000 registered workplaces (US Dept of State 2010). Over 2007 the government reported 64 workplace 
fatalities and 5,545 non-fatal injuries to the ILO, as well as 6.3 fatal injuries per 100,000 insured. The rates 
were highest in utilities, mining, and transport, storage and communications – in the last sector for women 
even higher than for men. From 2001-03 on, both the number of fatalities and of other accidents were fall-
ing, but this fall is parallelled by a decrease in the number of those in wage employment i.e. insured (ILO 
Laborsta). The draft government report on migration notes that the majority of unskilled emigrants from 
Zimbabwe in South Africa faces poor working conditions (Republic of Zimbabwe 2010). 
Working hours is another major issue in working conditions, but here too the last comprehensive evi-
dence dates back from 1999. At the time, many worked extremely long hours: 54% of the labour force aged 
15 and more worked longer than 40 hours of week, and 14% over 60 hours per week. For all female em-
ployed, these shares were respectively 45% and 12%. In total, only 13% worked less than 25 hours weekly; 
for women this share was 18%. As for employment status, in 1999 paid employees by far made the longest 
hours, with over 70% working over 40 hours and 26% over 60 hours; with 68% respectively 21%, these 
shares were hardly lower for females. Remarkable was that only 3% of female paid employees worked less 
than 25 hours. By contrast, much lower shares of self-employed worked over 40 hours (38%) or over 60 
hours (9%); again, for female self-employed these ﬁ  gures were with 36% and 8% only slightly lower. 22% 
of all self-employed and 24% of all female self-employed worked less than 25 hours (all data: authors’ cal-
culations based on ILO Laborsta). Against the backdrop of the immense underutilisation of labour and the 
relative expansion of the informal sector, overall working-time patterns of both men and women after 2000 
most likely have shifted towards the pattern of the self-employed, with shorter and irregular hours. In rather 
ﬂ  ourishing businesses in the formal sector making 52-55 hours per week may continue as normal practice, 
with on Saturdays mostly working half day (cf. Zhangazha 2010d-k).Page ● 63
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3.  Basic information for WageIndicator 
Questionnaire
3.1. Introduction
DECISIONS FOR LIFE Activities 1.03a and 1.03b have resulted in a number of lists, grouped in this 
Chapter and to be used in the WageIndicator web-survey for country-speciﬁ  c questions and their analyses. 
This basic information can be used on-line, but if needed also off-line. The lists contain information on 
educational categories and ISCED levels (3.3), regions (3.4), ethnic groups (3.5.1) and languages (3.5.2).
3.2.  List of trade unions
Zimbabwe’s trade union movement has already been introduced under Labour relations (section 2.4.2). 
Below, a list can be found of unions active in the country, designed for use in the web-survey.
Table 5. List of trade unions in Zimbabwe (by 1/1/2010)
en_ZW Source label Translation
716101 ZWE ZCTU Associated Mine Workers Union of 
Zimbabwe (AMUZ)
Associated Mine Workers’ Union of Zimbabwe 
(AMUZ)
716102 ZWE ZCTU General Agriculture and Plantation 
Workers Union Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ)
General Agriculture and Plantation Workers’ 
Union Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ)
716103 ZWE ZCTU Progressive Teachers Union of Zim-
babwe (PTUZ)
Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe 
(PTUZ)
716104 ZWE ZCTU Railway Artisans Union (RAU); Rail-
way Enginemen Association (REA)
Railway Artisans Union (RAU); Railway Engine-
men Association (REA)
716105 ZWE ZCTU Transport and General Workers 
Union (TGWU) Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU)
716106 ZWE ZCTU Zimbabwe Domestic and Allied 
Workers Union (ZDAWU)
Zimbabwe Domestic and Allied Workers Union 
(ZDAWU)
716107 ZWE ZCTU Zimbabwe Security Guards Union 
(ZISEGU) Zimbabwe Security Guards Union (ZISEGU)
716201 ZWE University Teachers Association (AUT) University Teachers’ Association (AUT)
716202 ZWE Zimbabwe Medical Associations (ZMA) (for 
doctors) 
Zimbabwe Medical Associations (ZMA) (for 
doctors) 
716203 ZWE Zimbabwe Nurses Association (ZNA) Zimbabwe Nurses Association (ZNA)
716204 ZWE Zimbabwe Teachers Association (ZIMTA) Zimbabwe Teachers’ Association (ZIMTA)
9999 INT Other OtherPage ● 64
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3.3.  List of educational categories and ISCED levels
Below, a full list of the educational categories used in Zimbabwe, designed for use in the web-survey and 
including the ISCED levels attached to them, can be found.
Table 6. List of educational categories in Zimbabwe (by 1/1/2010)
en_ZW Source label Translation  ISCED
716001 ZWE No formal education No formal education 0
716002 ZWE Primary school - incomplete, with-
out Grade 7 certiﬁ  cate
Primary school - incomplete, without Grade 7 
certiﬁ  cate 1
716003 ZWE Primary school - complete, with 
Grade 7 certiﬁ  cate
Primary school - complete, with Grade 7 
certiﬁ  cate 1
716004 ZWE Zimbabwe Junior Certiﬁ  cate (ZJC) Zimbabwe Junior Certiﬁ  cate (ZJC) 2
716005 ZWE Ordinary level (O Level) Ordinary level (O Level) 3
716006 ZWE Advanced level certiﬁ  cate (A level) Advanced level certiﬁ  cate (A level) 3
716010 ZWE Vocational College Vocational College 4
716007 ZWE University degree University degree 5
716008 ZWE Postgraduate qualiﬁ  cation Postgraduate qualiﬁ  cation 5
716009 ZWE Doctorate Doctorate 6
3.4.  List of regions
Below, a full draft list of the regions in Zimbabwe, designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.
Table 7. List of regions in Zimbabwe (by 1/1/2010)




7160100000 7160100131 ZWE Bulawayo ZWE Bulawayo Bula-
wayo Bulawayo Bulawayo
7160100000 7160100202 ZWE Bulawayo ZWE Bulawayo The 
suburbs of Bulawayo Bulawayo The suburbs of 
Bulawayo
7160200000 7160200331 ZWE Harare ZWE Harare Chitung-
wiza Harare Chitungwiza
7160200000 7160200431 ZWE Harare ZWE Harare Epworth Harare Epworth
7160200000 7160200501 ZWE Harare ZWE Harare Harare Harare Harare
7160200000 7160200602 ZWE Harare ZWE Harare The sub-
urbs of Harare Harare The suburbs of 
Harare
7160300000 7160300732 ZWE Manicaland ZWE Manicaland 
Chipinge Manicaland Chipinge
7160300000 7160300831 ZWE Manicaland ZWE Manicaland Mu-
tare  Manicaland Mutare 
7160300000 7160300932 ZWE Manicaland ZWE Manicaland Ru-
sape  Manicaland Rusape 
7160300000 7160309632 ZWE Manicaland
ZWE Manicaland A 






7160300000 7160309704 ZWE Manicaland ZWE Manicaland A vil-
lage (less than 10,000) Manicaland A village (10,000 
or less)
7160300000 7160309805 ZWE Manicaland ZWE Manicaland Rural 
area Manicaland Rural areaPage ● 65
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7160400000 7160400132 ZWE Mashona-
land Central
ZWE Mashonaland Cen-
tral Bindura Mashonaland Central Bindura
7160400000 7160400232 ZWE Mashona-
land Central
ZWE Mashonaland Cen-
tral Shamva Mashonaland Central Shamva
7160400000 7160409632 ZWE Mashona-
land Central
ZWE Mashonaland Cen-






7160400000 7160409704 ZWE Mashona-
land Central
ZWE Mashonaland Cen-
tral A village (less than 
10,000)
Mashonaland Central A village (10,000 
or less)
7160400000 7160409805 ZWE Mashona-
land Central
ZWE Mashonaland Cen-
tral Rural area Mashonaland Central Rural area
7160500000 7160500131 ZWE Mashona-
land East
ZWE Mashonaland East 
Chitungwiza Mashonaland East Chitungwiza
7160500000 7160500332 ZWE Mashona-
land East
ZWE Mashonaland 
Marondera Mashonaland East Marondera
7160500000 7160500232 ZWE Mashona-
land East
ZWE Mashonaland East 
Ruwa  Mashonaland East Ruwa 
7160500000 7160509632 ZWE Mashona-
land East
ZWE Mashonaland East 






7160500000 7160509704 ZWE Mashona-
land East
ZWE Mashonaland 
East A village (less than 
10,000)
Mashonaland East A village (10,000 
or less)
7160500000 7160509805 ZWE Mashona-
land East
ZWE Mashonaland East 
Rural area Mashonaland East Rural area
7160600000 7160600132 ZWE Mashona-
land West
ZWE Mashonaland West 
Chegutu Mashonaland West Chegutu
7160600000 7160600232 ZWE Mashona-
land West
ZWE Mashonaland West 
Chinhoyi Mashonaland West Chinhoyi
7160600000 7160600332 ZWE Mashona-
land West
ZWE Mashonaland West 
Kadoma  Mashonaland West Kadoma 
7160600000 7160600532 ZWE Mashona-
land West
ZWE Mashonaland West 
Karoi Mashonaland West Karoi
7160600000 7160600432 ZWE Mashona-
land West
ZWE Mashonaland West 
Norton Mashonaland West Norton
7160600000 7160609632 ZWE Mashona-
land West
ZWE Mashonaland West 






7160600000 7160609704 ZWE Mashona-
land West
ZWE Mashonaland 
West A village (less than 
10,000)
Mashonaland West A village (10,000 
or less)
7160600000 7160609805 ZWE Mashona-
land West
ZWE Mashonaland West 
Rural area Mashonaland West Rural area
7160700000 7160700132 ZWE Masvingo 
(Victoria)
ZWE Masvingo (Victo-
ria) Chiredzi Masvingo (Victoria) Chiredzi
7160700000 7160700232 ZWE Masvingo 
(Victoria)
ZWE Masvingo (Vic-
toria) Masvingo (Fort 
Victoria)
Masvingo (Victoria) Masvingo (Fort 
Victoria)
7160700000 7160709632 ZWE Masvingo 
(Victoria)
ZWE Masvingo (Victo-






7160700000 7160709704 ZWE Masvingo 
(Victoria)
ZWE Masvingo (Victo-
ria) A village (less than 
10,000)
Masvingo (Victoria) A village (10,000 
or less)
7160700000 7160709805 ZWE Masvingo 
(Victoria)
ZWE Masvingo (Victo-
ria) Rural area Masvingo (Victoria) Rural areaPage ● 66
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7160800000 7160800132 ZWE Matabele-
land North
ZWE Matabeleland 
North Hwange  Matabeleland North Hwange 
7160800000 7160800304 ZWE Matabele-
land North
ZWE Matabeleland 
North Lupane Matabeleland North Lupane
7160800000 7160800232 ZWE Matabele-
land North
ZWE Matabeleland 
North Victoria Falls Matabeleland North Victoria Falls
7160800000 7160809632 ZWE Matabele-
land North
ZWE Matabeleland 






7160800000 7160809704 ZWE Matabele-
land North
ZWE Matabeleland 
North A village (less 
than 10,000)
Matabeleland North A village (10,000 
or less)
7160800000 7160809805 ZWE Matabele-
land North
ZWE Matabeleland 
North Rural area Matabeleland North Rural area
7160900000 7160900132 ZWE Matabele-
land South
ZWE Matabeleland 
South Beitbridge Matabeleland South Beitbridge





Matabeleland South Gwanda (Jawun-
da)
7160900000 7160900332 ZWE Matabele-
land South
ZWE Matabeleland 
South Plumtree Matabeleland South Plumtree
7160900000 7160909632 ZWE Matabele-
land South
ZWE Matabeleland 






7160900000 7160909704 ZWE Matabele-
land South
ZWE Matabeleland 
South A village (less 
than 10,000)
Matabeleland South A village (10,000 
or less)
7160900000 7160909805 ZWE Matabele-
land South
ZWE Matabeleland 
South Rural area Matabeleland South Rural area
7161000000 7161000131 ZWE Midlands ZWE Midlands Gweru 
(Gwelo) Midlands Gweru (Gwelo)
7161000000 7161000232 ZWE Midlands ZWE Midlands Kwekwe 
(Que Que) Midlands Kwekwe (Que 
Que)
7161000000 7161000332 ZWE Midlands ZWE Midlands Redcliff Midlands Redcliff
7161000000 7161000432 ZWE Midlands ZWE Midlands Zvisha-
vane Midlands Zvishavane
7161000000 7161009632 ZWE Midlands ZWE Midlands A small 




7161000000 7161009704 ZWE Midlands ZWE Midlands A village 
(less than 10,000) Midlands A village (10,000 
or less)
7161000000 7161009805 ZWE Midlands ZWE Midlands Rural 
area Midlands Rural areaPage ● 67
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3.5.  List of ethnic groups and languages
3.5.1. Ethnic  groups
Below, a list of the main ethnic groups living in Zimbabwe and designed for use in the web-survey, can 
be found. 
Table 8. List of ethnic groups in Zimbabwe (by 1/1/2009)
en_ZW Source label Translation
716001 ZWE Shona Shona
716002 ZWE Ndebele Ndebele
716003 ZWE Tonga Tonga
716004 ZWE Sotho  Sotho 
716005 ZWE Venda Venda
716006 ZWE Tsonga/Shangaan  Tsonga/Shangaan 
716007 ZWE Bi-racial Bi-racial
716008 ZWE European European
716009 ZWE Asian Asian
716010 ZWE Malawian Malawian
716011 ZWE Mozambican Mozambican
716999 ZWE Other Other
716998 ZWE Not applicable Not applicable
3.5.2. Languages
Below, a list of the languages used in Zimbabwe and designed for use in the web-survey, can be found. 
Table 9. List of languages in Zimbabwe (by 1/1/2010)
en_ZW Source label Translation
716001 ZWE English English
716002 ZWE Shona Shona
716003 ZWE Ndebele Ndebele
716004 ZWE Tonga  Tonga  
716005 ZWE Sotho  Sotho 
716006 ZWE Venda Venda
716007 ZWE Tsonga/Shangaan  Tsonga/Shangaan 
716008 ZWE Kalanga Kalanga
716998 ZWE Local dialect Local dialect
716999 ZWE Other language Other languagePage ● 68
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What is WageIndicator?
WageIndicator has websites in 50 countries. In every country, a national website has a free Salary Check. 
This Check provides detailed information about the wages, on average earned in a wide range of occupa-
tions, taken into account personal characteristics, such as tenure/age, education, supervisory position, re-
gion and alike. 
Apart from the Salary Check, the websites in many countries have attractive web-tools, such as Mini-
mum Wage Checks, DecentWorkCheck, Gross-Net Earnings Check, and alike. In addition, most websites 
have content about wages, working conditions, labour standards and related topics. Each country has at least 
one website. Multilingual countries have two or more websites. In addition, many countries have websites 
for target groups, for example women or youth. The project website is www.wageindicator.org. 
Worldwide, the national WageIndicator websites attract large numbers of web-visitors. The websites are 
consulted by workers for their job mobility decisions, annual performance talks or wage negotiations. They 
are consulted by school pupils, students or re-entrant women facing occupational choices, or by employers 
in small and medium sized companies when recruiting staff or negotiating wages with their employees. 
In return for all free information provided, the web-visitors are encouraged to complete a web-survey, 
which takes 10 to 20 minutes. The survey has detailed questions about earnings, beneﬁ  ts, working conditions, 
employment contract, training, as well as questions about education, occupation, industry, and household 
characteristics. This web-survey is comparable across all countries. The web-survey is continuously posted 
at all WageIndicator websites, of course in the national language(s) and adapted to country-speciﬁ  c issues, 
where needed. The data from the web-survey are used for the calculations, underlying the Salary Check. For 
occupations with at least 50 observations in the national database a salary indication can be calculated. The 
Salary Checks are updated annually.
The project started in 2000 in the Netherlands with a large-scale, paper-based survey to collect data on 
women’s wages. In 2001 the ﬁ  rst WageIndicator website with a Salary Check and a web-survey was launched. 
Since 2004, websites were launched in European countries, in North and South America, in South-Africa, 
and in countries in Asia. All large economies of the world currently have a WageIndicator website, among 
which the USA, the Russian Federation, China, India and Brazil. From 2009 onwards, websites are being 
launched in more African countries, as well as in Indonesia and in a number of post-soviet countries. More 
information about the WageIndicator Foundation and its activities can be found at www.wageindicator.org.Page ● 76
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Information about AIAS
AIAS is a young interdisciplinary institute, established in 1998, aiming to become the leading expert cen-
tre in the Netherlands for research on industrial relations, organisation of work, wage formation and labour 
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